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Abstract 
 
 
Through the analysis of idealistic arguments and evidence from physics, it will be demonstrated 
that monistic idealism has a great deal of explanatory power as a metaphysical system for the 
reality that one experiences. Some of the arguments that support this claim include the 
inadequateness of Cartesian matter, the seemingly infinite divisibility of atoms, matter being 
reducible to sensations, the unnecessary aspect of matter, and simplicity. Evidence from quantum 
physics includes such factors as the necessary role of an observer in the collapse of a quantum 
wave function and the element of nonlocality. Psychological experiments including nonlocal 
communication, the power of mental force, and the placebo effect further justify the case for 
monistic idealism.   
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Introduction 
 
 
Everything is connected. That theory has been around for ages and the question of how 
everything is connected has troubled philosophers for just as long. Thales was the first recorded 
philosopher (c. 600 B.C.) to propose a solution to this question in his theory that water is what 
connects everything. Ever since Thales, many different solutions to this problem have been 
developed. In ancient times this question was considered the “problem of the one and the many,” 
but it eventually became expressed in the mind-body problem as the theories ultimately fell into 
three categories. The first category is labeled “materialism,” (also known as physicalism) which 
states that everything is ultimately material (or physical) in nature, and so everything is 
connected through material substance. In other words, the physical is the metaphysical 
foundation of all things. Materialism is a variant of the metaphysical view called “substance 
monism,” which argues that the foundation of all things is ultimately one in nature. For 
materialism, everything is one in the sense that everything is material. Monism contrasts with the 
view of “pluralism,” which claims that there is more than one substance that make up reality. 
The main type of metaphysical pluralism is called “dualism.” This view holds that there are two 
foundational types of substance that make up reality, which are “mind” and “body.” This view 
argues that there is more to this world than just the material aspects, namely that there is a 
spiritual or conscious side to reality that can be classified as “mind.” These are two distinct 
substances, mind and body, that work together to form this world. The third view is called 
“idealism” and it states that the foundation of all things is ultimately immaterial. This foundation 
can be any immaterial substance such as consciousness, mind, or spirit. Thus, this view argues 
that everything in reality reduces to an immaterial foundation. Philosophers typically categorize 
idealism as a type of substance monism, just like materialism.  
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Each of these three views (materialism, dualism, and idealism) faces numerous problems 
in their explanation of reality. The main problem facing materialism is how to reconcile it with 
such phenomena as mind, consciousness, and spirit. The primary dilemma with dualism is 
explaining the interaction between mind and body if they are two separate substances. Another 
issue facing dualism is simplicity or Occam’s razor: Why multiply the principle foundational 
elements if an explanation with one principle works sufficiently? The main issue that idealism 
contends with is how to explain the physical appearance of the world. Materialism and dualism 
will not be the focus of this project. Instead, it will focus on consciousness and idealism. Since 
consciousness poses a serious problem to both materialism (viz., how to account for it) and 
dualism (viz., how it interacts with body), the view of idealism should at least be examined, and 
that is what this thesis will do. Steven B. Cowan and James S. Spiegel, both proponents of 
Berkeleyan idealism (Cowan a recent convert),1 coedited Idealism and Christianity, Volume 2: 
Idealism and Christian Philosophy, which was published by Bloomsbury Academic just this year 
with the goal of redeeming Berkeleyan immaterialism, contending that it has not been taken 
seriously by most philosophers. Cowan and Spiegel “believe that Berkeleyan idealism—the 
thesis that all that exists are minds and their ideas—has immense benefits for virtually every area 
of human understanding, from theoretical issues in philosophy and theology to the most practical 
concerns of human life.”2 It is interesting to note that in their project they refer to “substance 
dualism” as a version of materialism because they consider materialism to be “any view which 
affirms the mind-independence of physical objects.”3 This is not the case for this project, but 
                                                
1 Steven B. Cowan and James S. Spiegel, eds., Idealism and Christianity, vol. 2, Idealism and Christian 
Philosophy (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), iix. 
2 Ibid., 1. 
3 Ibid., 6. 
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neither will dualism be considered in detail due to the scope of this thesis. 
This project will examine some of the arguments and evidence for idealism to determine 
if there are any sound reasons for believing in such a metaphysical system. Idealism can account 
for consciousness easily enough and it fulfills Occam’s razor better than dualism, inasmuch as it 
is a monistic system. The main questions that remain will be whether there are good reasons for 
believing in idealism and how exactly this system can explain the material aspect of the world 
that everyone experiences. Several principal idealist philosophers and their arguments will be 
studied, including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, George Berkeley, and Immanuel Kant. These 
philosophers will be the topics of the first two chapters. Scientific evidence will be examined in 
chapter three, with the focus on experiments done in quantum physics and psychology. Such 
topics will include the theories and experiments done by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Max 
Born, Eugene Wigner, John von Neumann, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, Nathan Rosen, 
Erwin Schrödinger, Alain Aspect, John Bell, and others. Such theories and experiments will 
include the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, 
Schrödinger’s equation, Schrödinger’s cat, wave-particle duality, quantum entanglement, Bell’s 
theorem, and Aspect’s experiments. Experiments in psychology will also be considered, 
including such topics of nonlocal communication, mental force, and the placebo effect.  
The specific warrants for idealism will be a combination of arguments from Leibniz’s 
monadic idealism, Berkeley’s subjective idealism, and Kant’s transcendental idealism, which, 
taken together, express a more encompassing monistic idealism. Leibniz argues that this world is 
created from simple substances that he calls monads. He argues that every monad has a certain 
level of perception4 and that these monads are all connected through God’s consciousness in a 
                                                
4 G.W. Leibniz, The Principles of Philosophy known as Monadology, trans. Jonathan Bennett, 3, last 
modified July 2007, accessed April 24, 2016, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf. 
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universal harmony.5 This type of idealism is similar to Berkeley’s view that existence (or 
“being”) is to perceive or be perceived. A priority is placed on the One that always perceives 
everything, God, and the means through which He does so.6 Berkeley is essentially arguing that 
reality ultimately exists and is connected through God’s consciousness. Thus, from Leibniz and 
Berkeley one can already begin to see a universal theme in their idealism. This theme is that God, 
as creator, facilitates a perception of reality in knowing subjects. This manifestation of reality is 
ultimately done so that spiritual beings (souls/persons) can have a sensible (or tangible) reality 
for experience and life (tangible meaning that God produces for His creatures a reality they can 
experience through sensations, though this does not require a separate substance, matter). In fact, 
A.A. Luce argues that “[m]atter by definition is invisible and intangible; it does not match our 
sensory experience; it cannot be applied thereto; it cannot test the quality of what we see and 
touch…. Problems of sense-perception must be solved in terms of the perceivable by sense.”7 
Idealism contends that the existence of sensible reality stems completely from God’s production 
of it. Thus, the ultimate basis of reality is God’s consciousness. This reality is made sensible and 
has a mode of extension, but the primary substance is consciousness (or thought, mind, idea, 
spirit, etc.). Idealists like Berkeley contend that the reality of the material world is not being 
denied, just understood in a different way (through sense perception and a different 
understanding of the metaphysical foundation). This philosophy argues for a unified 
consciousness at the core of reality. Humans are primarily conscious beings (or souls) with a 
tangible sense of reality provided by, and connected through, God’s consciousness. This can be 
                                                
5 Leibniz, Monadology, 8. 
6 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge, trans. Jonathan Bennett, 18, last modified 
November 2007, accessed April 24, 2016, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/berkeley1710.pdf. 
7 A. A. Luce, Sense Without Matter or Direct Perception (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1954), 97. 
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compared to the way in which the dream world seems to incorporate everything that reality does 
yet one would not say that the dream world contains matter since dreams exist completely in the 
mind. Since the mind is capable of producing a tangible reality in the dream world, then how 
much more so would God’s mind be capable of creating a tangible reality for His creation? 
God’s infinite mind would certainly be capable of creating an entire reality that people can live 
in without actually needing to create a separate substance of matter. As Berkeley says, matter 
would be an unnecessary tool for God.8 It can also be seen how God’s infinite mind and creation 
would have natural laws that govern this reality, because they would be stemming from the 
nature of His mind. This dream analogy will be helpful for understanding the type of 
metaphysical reality that these philosophers were explaining. The monistic idealism argued for 
will be a broader type of idealism with a unified consciousness as its foundation. This type of 
idealism will be argued for rather than a specific philosopher’s idealism due to the scope of this 
project and in order to argue that idealism in general should be considered more seriously and 
not necessarily one version of idealism. Therefore, the aim of this project will be to combine 
several of the arguments and support from Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, quantum physics, and 
psychology to propose a monistic idealism that can be defended as a strong theory that should 
require greater consideration as a solution to the mind-body problem.  
By way of clarifying the limitations of this project I will include a few points. Before 
discussing these I want to mention on the topic of clarification that all italicized words within 
quotes throughout this project are from the author quoted and not me. With that proviso aside, I 
will not have space in this project to discuss any branches of philosophy that may stem from the 
                                                
8 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in opposition to Skeptics and Atheists, 
trans. Jonathan Bennett, 34, last modified November 2007, accessed April 24, 2016, 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/berkeley1713.pdf. 
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specific metaphysics of idealism that I will be discussing. Thus, such topics as freedom, ethics, 
morals, epistemology, etc. will not be discussed here. There will also not be enough space in this 
thesis to discuss in depth each view of materialism, dualism, and idealism. Materialism and 
dualism will not be discussed much because my primary focus will be on idealism. Materialism 
and dualism both have ways of dealing with the mind-body problem; however, in light of the 
problems that these views do face, I am in a sense setting them aside in order to more fully 
consider idealism. Thus, there will be no arguments against materialism or dualism, except in 
passing, due to the length of this project; only arguments in favor of idealism will be given. I will 
also be unable to discuss in depth the different forms of idealism. Instead, the focus of this paper 
will not stray far from the specific views of Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, and the more broad form of 
monistic idealism that incorporates aspects of each. I will in some ways be taking the assumption 
of theism because it is not my purpose to provide a proof for God’s existence. Rather, this 
discussion of idealism will provide support for a theistic God inasmuch as I argue that a 
conscious creator is a strong explanation of how reality came to be. It is not my main objective to 
prove that God exists, but to discover the best explanation of the reality we experience, which 
ends up including God necessarily. My goal is to show that it is plausible to view the nature of 
everything in reality as consciousness (or spiritual).  
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Chapter 1  
 
Support from Leibniz  
 
 
It was in the fifth century B.C. that Democritus proposed his theory of atoms as the 
means by which everything is connected. In the eighteenth century, Leibniz was arguing that his 
theory of monads was the best explanation of metaphysics and that monads were similar to 
atoms, albeit that they were spiritual in nature. He states in Monadology that “[t]here must be 
simple substances, because there are composites. A composite thing is just a collection of simple 
ones that happen to have come together. Something that has no parts can’t be extended, can’t 
have a shape, and can’t be split up. So monads are the true atoms of Nature—the elements out of 
which everything is made.”9 It was not until the twentieth century that technology developed 
enough to finally discover the atom, which brought strong support for each of these theories. The 
atom will be discussed more in chapter three, but Leibniz’s metaphysical system is built upon his 
monadology and this chapter will examine that system. The three key elements of Leibniz’s 
monadology that will be outlined are his universal harmony that brings his system into a 
connectedness through God’s consciousness, the incorporeal nature of monads, and his argument 
that perception cannot be explained by mechanical principles. 
Leibniz emphasizes both the separateness and connectedness of monads. He first 
emphasizes the separateness of monads by clarifying that they are windowless and do not affect 
one another.10 Frederick Copleston explains that “each monad forms a world apart, in the sense 
                                                
9 Leibniz, Monadology, 1. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
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that it develops its potentialities from within.”11 Although monads are not able to directly interact 
with one another, Leibniz does not deny “that on the phenomenal level there is what we call 
efficient or mechanical causality: he did not, for example, deny that it is true to say that the door 
slammed because a gust of wind exercised pressure on it. But we must distinguish between the 
physical level at which this statement is true and the metaphysical level at which we speak about 
monads.”12 Due to this separateness of each monad, Leibniz’s is a pluralistic form of idealism. 
However, one of his successors, Hermann Lotze, discerning the unity of this system, developed it 
more along monistic lines.13 According to Hiralal Haldar, Leibniz begins by emphasizing the 
separateness of the monads, “but, in the end, he is compelled to conceive of them as proceeding 
from and depending on God and as organized by Him into the unity of a coherent world. Lotze 
makes this deeper thought of Leibniz prominent. He shows that so far from being independent of 
each other, things are real only as they are related to each other. To be is to ‘stand in 
relations.’”14 The connectedness of monads in Leibniz’s system takes place through God. 
Leibniz mentions this and makes several important remarks about the mind in his Discourse on 
Metaphysics: 
Minds are actually the most perfectible of substances, and their perfections have 
the special feature that they obstruct one another the least, or rather that they help one 
another—for only the most virtuous could be the most perfect friends. From which it 
plainly follows that God, who always aims at the greatest perfection in general, will have 
the greatest care for minds, and will give to them (not only in general, but also to each 
particular mind) the highest level of perfection that the universal harmony will allow. It 
can be said indeed that God’s being a mind is what qualifies him as the reason why things 
exist. If he couldn’t voluntarily choose the best, there would be no reason why one 
                                                
11 Frederick Charles Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 4, Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to 
Leibniz (New York: Image Books, 1994), 308. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hiralal Haldar, “Leibniz and German Idealism,” The Philosophical Review 26, no. 4 (1917): 393. 
14 Ibid. 
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possible thing should exist rather than some other. So of all the features of created things 
that God takes into account, he attends first and foremost to the quality that he shares 
with them, namely that of being a Mind. Only minds are made in his image, are of his 
race (so to speak), are like children of his house, for only they can serve him freely, and 
act in imitation of the divine nature, knowing what they are doing. A single mind is worth 
a whole world, since it not only expresses the world, but also knows it, and governs itself 
there after the fashion of God. Thus, it seems that although each substance expresses the 
entire universe, Minds express God rather than the world, whereas other substances 
express the world rather than God.15 
 
Leibniz’s system is based on an understanding that God is the most perfect being. Leibniz points 
out in this passage that minds are the most perfectible of substances and that they hold the 
highest value for God. He also explains that it is because God is ultimately Mind that things even 
exist. Thus, God’s mind (or consciousness) is the foundation and reason why everything exists. 
God’s mind and perfection grant Him the ability to choose the best possible world to exist. This 
is also why Leibniz claims that only minds are made in God’s image and express God, while 
other substances only express the world. Copleston contends that the reason Leibniz 
distinguished minds (or souls) from normal monads stemmed from a dissatisfaction he had with 
the atomic theory of Democritus and Epicurus: 
[T]he atoms of Democritus and Epicurus were not true unities. Possessing size and shape, 
they could not be the ultimate factors discoverable by analysis. Even if their physical 
indivisibility were postulated, they would still be divisible in principle. The ultimate 
constituents of things must, therefore, be “points,” though not mathematical points. They 
must be, then, metaphysical points, distinct both from physical points, which are 
indivisible in appearance only, and from mathematical points, which do not exist and 
cannot together form bodies. Further, these metaphysical points, which are logically prior 
to body, must be conceived after the analogy of souls. There must be some internal 
principle of differentiation, and Leibniz decided that these substantial units are 
distinguished from one another by the degree of “perception” and “appetite” which each 
possess. He frequently called them “souls,” therefore, though in order to be able to 
distinguish between souls in the ordinary sense and other substantial units he came to 
employ the word “monad” as a general term. “Monas is a Greek word which signifies 
unity or that which is one.”16  
                                                
15 G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. Jonathan Bennett, 25, last modified July 2007, accessed 
April 24, 2016, http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1686d.pdf. 
16 Copleston, From Descartes to Leibniz, 297-298. 
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So there is an important distinction between monads that make up minds or souls and monads 
that are used to create the world. Each mind is significant since each one is worth a whole world 
and each mind is separate, yet all minds are connected through God. Haldar thoroughly explains 
this, stating, “[W]hatever may have been the starting point of Leibniz, his final view of the world 
is that it is an orderly whole of interrelated reals, which are monads possessing ideas of different 
degrees of clearness, all comprised within the being of God who, if He transcends them, is also 
immanent in them and of whose mind they are the embodiment or expression.”17 This orderly 
whole of interrelated reals, whose individual perceptions are constituted by God, is exactly what 
Leibniz is discussing in the passage above. The interrelatedness is what Leibniz referred to as the 
“universal harmony.” Leibniz’s monads are all separate, simple substances, yet they all work 
together through a harmony constituted by God. Haldar agrees that Leibniz introduced a 
foundational idea (which was reaffirmed by Kant, Hegel, and Lotze) that at the basic level this 
world is spirit and its nature is to be one in many. Haldar also argues that Leibniz struggled with 
reconciling the unity and plurality of this concept, but recognized both of these aspects of reality 
in his philosophy.18 Thus, Leibniz emphasizes the key concept that the core of reality is spirit and 
not physical substance. A foundational point of his philosophy was to deny Cartesian matter. 
 The second key element of Leibniz’s monadology is the incorporeal nature of monads. 
The main system of thinking that surrounded Leibniz at the time was the concept of matter as 
understood in the Cartesian sense. Leibniz found several faults with this concept of matter. In his 
Philosophical Essays, Leibniz explains, “I don’t really eliminate body, but reduce [revoco] it to 
what it is. For I show that corporeal mass [massa], which is thought to have something over and 
                                                
17 Haldar, 379. 
18 Ibid., 393-394. 
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above simple substances, is not a substance, but a phenomenon resulting from simple substances, 
which alone have unity and absolute reality.”19 Leibniz thus denies matter in the Cartesian sense 
that sensible objects have a material basis. Instead, Leibniz argues that matter, as people 
understand it, is built upon an incorporeal substance, instances of what he calls simple substances, 
or monads. This new understanding of substance could simply be viewed as a different 
understanding of matter rather than a complete rejection of it. Paul Redding argues that Leibniz 
attempts to reconcile differing views on the subject. He claims that one of the traits of 
continental idealism in general is “[t]he stance of rational reconcilationism— the irenic intention 
to reconcile conflicting stances or orientations towards the world, rather than simply take sides…. 
Thus Leibniz can be interpreted as attempting to reconcile the modern mechanistic worldview of 
Galileo and Newton with ancient Greek metaphysical notions based on the Aristotelian concept 
of ‘substance.’”20 As Leibniz saw the world from his interrelated perspective, he attempted to 
reconcile the differing views of his time. One reason Leibniz sought to understand substance in a 
new way was that everything material is only made up of something smaller. In their book 
Idealism: The History of a Philosophy, Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson 
explain how both Leibniz and Descartes argued that the material atom could not be the 
foundation of the universe because everything material is comprised of something smaller than 
that certain quantity of matter. The foundation of extension must instead be something that is 
non-extended or incorporeal in nature.21 As Dunham, Grant, and Watson state, “The natural 
world must have non-spatiotemporal constituents as its prerequisites. This should have been the 
                                                
19 G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Dan Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1989), 181. 
20 Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche (New York: Routledge, 2009), 3. 
21 Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson, Idealism: The History of a Philosophy 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 62. 
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conclusion to Descartes’ metaphysics. These non-extended constituents (monads) are the true 
unities in nature and the ultimate forces from which extended nature derives its power.”22 It 
makes sense that space and time could not be founded on something that is also spatiotemporal; 
its foundation must lie on something outside of space and time. Since space is ultimately 
extension, this spatiotemporal reality must be based on something non-extended, or rather 
something incorporeal, like Leibniz’s monads. These monads, which have a spiritual nature 
stemming from God’s mind, would make for a more sound foundation for the world that one 
experiences. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain that another argument Leibniz had against the 
Cartesian understanding of matter and Descartes’ natural philosophy is that if matter were just 
extension, then “there could be no true unities in nature and only aggregates. All true unities 
must have some metaphysical substantial union. A sandcastle does not have a true substantial 
union, but is merely an aggregate, whereas I, on the other hand, am not merely an aggregate, but 
a substantial union whereby all of my organs work together and create a single being— a 
unity.”23 Thus, the basis of matter must be something more foundational and unified than mere 
tiny, physical substances. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain that “for Leibniz, no real unity 
can be discovered in extended matter alone, only aggregation; however, in the metaphysical 
realm, substantial union can be found and it is at this level that my unity can be explained. The 
true unities from which the world is composed are Leibniz’s monads: non-spatiotemporal 
substances that are the true purveyors of qualities and phenomena.”24 In other words, something 
must be holding all of the matter together in a unified way, and this cannot be mere matter alone 
                                                
22 Dunham, Grant, and Watson, 62. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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but something more foundational, something not limited by space and time, and infinitely 
divisible, but something nonspatial, nontemporal, i.e., “simple.” If this is the case and there is 
something deeper than matter, then what exactly is matter to Leibniz? He claims that “it is not 
necessary to say that matter is nothing, but it is sufficient to say that it is a phenomenon, like the 
rainbow; and that it is not a substance, but the resultant of substances, and that space is no more 
real than time, that is, that space is nothing but the order of coexistences, just as time is the order 
of things that have existed before [subexistentia].”25 Since the metaphysical foundation of reality, 
according to Leibniz, is actually the incorporeal or spiritual monads, matter does not exist on its 
own in his system. Rather, it is dependent on monads, making matter more of a phenomenon 
experienced by monads than a reality in and of itself. Leibniz therefore reveals that he is 
searching for the foundation of matter and explaining it from a different perspective rather than 
denying it altogether.  
 The third key element of Leibniz’s metaphysics outlined in this project is his 
understanding of perception. He states in Monadology section seventeen: “It has to be 
acknowledged that perception can’t be explained by mechanical principles, that is by shapes and 
motions, and thus that nothing that depends on perception can be explained in that way either.”26 
Leibniz provides the following analogy to further describe this insight: 
Suppose this were wrong. Imagine there were a machine whose structure produced 
thought, feeling, and perception; we can conceive of its being enlarged while maintaining 
the same relative proportions among its parts, so that we could walk into it as we can 
walk into a mill. Suppose we do walk into it; all we would find there are cogs and levers 
and so on pushing one another, and never anything to account for a perception. So 
perception must be sought in simple substances, not in composite things like machines. 
And that is all that can be found in a simple substance—perceptions and changes in 
perceptions; and those changes are all that the internal actions of simple substances can 
                                                
25 Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 307. 
26 Leibniz, Monadology, 3. 
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consist in.27 
 
Thus, perception is best explained through incorporeal simple substances since material 
composite things are unable to account for it. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain that it is not 
possible to receive sensations from external objects in the views of Leibniz, Malebranche, or 
Berkeley. This is so because they believe that extension does not have the necessary means for 
causing any effect on the mind.28 This is one of the main issues facing the mind-body problem 
for dualism. According to Dunham, Grant, and Watson, all three of these philosophers agree that 
only God can provide people with the ideas that produce their phenomenal experience.29 
Dunham, Grant, and Watson draw a distinction between the views of Malebranche and Leibniz 
on this subject. They explain, “[F]or Malebranche, this doctrine means that the eternal and 
infinite ‘Ideas’ cannot exist in the minds of finite beings. To perceive any Idea is to participate in 
God’s eternal essence and God is our only light. For Leibniz, God replicates this very infinite 
and eternal essence in every single substance; every monad is omniscient, albeit confusedly.”30 
Thus, for both Malebranche and Leibniz, the origin of ideas and the means of perception stem 
straight from God. For Leibniz, “Our phenomenal experience is grounded by this replication and 
we perceive as mirrors of God… [so] Leibniz moves from a vision in God thesis to vision by 
God. God is still each monad’s only ‘light.’”31 The analogy that people perceive as mirrors of 
God demonstrates well how people’s perceptions ultimately have their origin in God, who is the 
source by which they see. Leibniz defends this view in his fifth reply of an exchange of papers 
                                                
27 Leibniz, Monadology, 3. 
28 Dunham, Grant, and Watson, 72. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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between him and Samuel Clarke.  
Leibniz rejects the idea that images of things are conveyed by the sense organs to the 
soul.32 He argues that there exists no conceivable vehicle or gate through which these images can 
travel from the organ to the soul.33 Against Cartesian dualism, Leibniz states: “The new 
Cartesians have shown well enough that this notion in the vulgar philosophy is not intelligible. It 
can’t be explained how immaterial substance is affected by matter; and basing an unintelligible 
notion on that is having recourse to the chimerical scholastic notion of I know not what 
inexplicable ‘intentional species’ passing from the organs to the soul.”34 This leads Leibniz to 
argue that it is unintelligible to say that God discerns what happens in the world because He is 
physically present to things. Leibniz says this is unintelligible under the Cartesian view because 
God is spirit and the world is material, so how could these separate substances know anything 
about each other even in close proximity? Leibniz says that they cannot and this is what is now 
called the mind-body problem. Instead, Leibniz argues that God has knowledge about the world 
because every monad’s “continued existence involves a dependence on him (a dependence that 
could be said to involve a continual production of them)…. A mere presence, or existence 
alongside, isn’t enough to make us understand how what happens in one being could correspond 
to what happens in another.”35 Leibniz argues here that God is able to have knowledge about His 
creation because everything is of the same substance (monads) and has its origin in Him. Thus, 
there is no mind-body problem in his view. Minds and “matter” should be considered as being 
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made of the same substance (monads), but with an ontological origin point in God. Again, 
Leibniz simply offers a different or deeper perspective on reality rather than denying the 
existence of matter. He reminds his readers that he does not acknowledge simple bodies and 
explains that nothing is simple besides monads, which do not “have parts and aren’t extended. 
Simple bodies, and perfectly alike bodies (whether simple or not), are a consequence of the false 
hypothesis of atoms and empty space, or of lazy philosophy that doesn’t push the analysis of 
things down to a deep enough level, and fancies it can attain to the first material elements of 
nature, because our imagination would be satisfied with it.”36 People can satisfy their 
imaginations with the idea of matter being the groundwork for all other matter, since it is all they 
physically see and experience every day. They do not often wonder what exactly comprises the 
matter they see or how they perceive it. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain that “when we 
perceive external objects we do not see monads as they really are because monads do not really 
look like anything; they have no spatiotemporal properties. They are composed exclusively of 
internal perceptions and the appetite to pass from one perception to another.”37 They clarify, 
“This does not mean, however, that what we see is false or an illusion. Our perceptions are in 
reality actual ‘expressions’ of this external world even if there is no true resemblance.”38 Since 
monads possess no spatiotemporal properties, perception becomes vitally important. One’s 
perception ultimately depends on God providing an external world for one to experience. In his 
Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz explains that much like the same town looks different from 
altered positions, each monad becomes a whole world as experienced in a way that “mirrors” 
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God. Leibniz states, “In a way, then, the universe is multiplied as many times as there are 
substances, and in the same way the glory of God is magnified by so many quite different 
representations of his work. It can even be said that each substance carries within it, in a certain 
way, the imprint of God’s infinite wisdom and omnipotence, and imitates him as far as it can.”39 
God’s mind generates countless monads, all of which connect to His mind. Each of these monads 
actively connects to God and serves as a differing perspective of reality. Dunham, Grant, and 
Watson explain that “for Leibniz, to be is to be active; this means that all forms are in some 
sense active at all times and, as they are reproduced in every single monad, they are always 
active in every single monad.”40 According to Leibniz, although each monad is active and 
connected to God, they do not all share the same level of perception. Thus, many of them 
perceive things confusedly.41 Leibniz elaborates by saying,  
For since all the bodies in the universe are in sympathy, our body receives the 
impressions of all the others, and although our senses are related to everything, our soul 
cannot possibly attend to each particular thing. Thus our confused feelings result from a 
downright infinite jumble of perceptions. In somewhat the same way the confused 
murmur that people hear when nearing the sea shore comes from the putting together of 
the reverberations of countless waves.42 
 
Dunham, Grant, and Watson accurately summarize Leibniz’s system, stating: “Leibniz’s world is 
made up of an infinity of self-sufficient monads all marching to their own tune as if a world apart, 
although in perfect harmony with every other monad…. In addition, it expresses every other 
monad’s current state within its being and this is how it is harmonized with its monadic 
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community.”43 Leibniz’s monadology served as an excellent beginning point for idealism and 
laid much of the groundwork. The next chapter will turn to the famous idealist philosophers of 
perception: Berkeley and Kant.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Support from Sense Perception: Berkeley and Kant 
 
 
 George Berkeley and Immanuel Kant revolutionized the way people think about the 
world. Berkeley is often considered the father of modern idealism, whether it be “subjective,” 
“skeptical,” “critical,” “psychological,” “panlogist,” or any other modern form of idealism. 
Edward Douglas Fawcett claims, “[I]dealists will all alike, when pressed, concede their 
indebtedness to the stimulus given by Berkeley…. Well has it been said that but for Berkeley 
there would have been no Hume and but for Hume no Kant. Aye, and but for Kant, –Fichte, 
Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and many of the leading idealists of today might never have 
caught the sparks that kindled their genius.”44 Berkeley’s full thesis can be summarized as “esse 
est percipi aut percipere: to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver.”45 Kant is known for his 
Copernican revolution in metaphysics and epistemology. Both of these philosophers’ arguments 
will be critically examined. Ultimately, support for idealism will be found in Berkeley’s 
arguments from sense perception, Occam’s razor, a dream analogy, and Kant’s pivotal change in 
epistemology.  
 For Berkeley, reality is a presentment for consciousness.46 Fawcett explains, regarding 
Berkeley, “[P]erception and its objects are inseparable; that the world is as truly suspended in 
consciousness as is the most subtle of thoughts or emotions.”47 Berkeley argues that all that 
exists are minds and ideas. John Russell Roberts classifies Berkeley’s view as a “monism of 
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minds.”48 Georges Dicker provides some insight into Berkeley’s immaterialism by making the 
following distinctions: “By holding this view, Berkeley does not mean that rocks, trees, tables, 
chairs, and so on do not exist. Rather, he means that they are only collections of ideas or of what 
he also calls sensations, which have no existence apart from being perceived by a mind. These 
ideas or sensations include visual ones, tactile ones, auditory ones, gustatory ones, and olfactory 
ones.”49 Thus, Berkeley’s system is a vastly different way of understanding reality. Berkeley 
points out that all a person really knows about “matter” are the secondary qualities that they 
experience through their senses. The qualities perceived by all five senses exist in the mind and 
not in matter or the object itself. Berkeley points out in The Three Dialogues that “if you take 
away all sensible qualities there is nothing left that is sensible…. Sensible things, then, are 
nothing but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities.”50 For example, 
Berkeley denies that heat exists independently of the mind’s sensation. Dunham, Grant, and 
Watson summarize Berkeley’s arguments for this in the following: “First, he says, heat is a kind 
of pain, and since, clearly, only those things capable of sense and perception are capable of 
experiencing pain, so heat (as a form of pain) is dependent for its existence on such sense and 
perception.”51 Furthermore, Berkeley uses the famous argument that “if one were to have one 
cold hand and one hot hand and plunge them into water at an intermediate temperature the water 
would feel cold to one hand and hot to the other, so how could the heat possibly be, in any sense, 
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‘in’ the water? What is the ‘real’ heat of the water?”52 Colors provide another example. Berkeley 
points out that colors cannot be in things themselves because color changes with different 
instruments, kinds of eyes, distances, and perspectives. To counter the argument that color is in 
the light, Dunham, Grant, and Watson remind people, “[B]erkeley points out that even according 
to this account the light must ‘shake’ the optic nerve in order to create a ‘sensation’ of a colour in 
the ‘mind.’ The colour, then, has ‘no existence without the mind.’”53 Thus, Berkeley has shown 
that secondary qualities are mind-dependent because they are simply sensible perceptions. 
However, what about primary qualities such as extension, shape, motion, rest, solidity, and 
number? In The Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley argues, “[I]f it is certain that (1) 
primary qualities are inseparably united with secondary ones, and can’t be abstracted from them 
even in thought, it clearly follows that (2) primary qualities exist only in the mind, just as the 
secondary ones do.”54 Berkeley then challenges his readers to attempt a mental abstraction 
whereby one conceives of a body extended and moving without any perceptible qualities. He 
argues that it is inconceivable to abstract extension, shape or motion from all other qualities.55 
Berkeley concludes that primary qualities, just like secondary ones, must exist only in the mind. 
Berkeley makes the following argument to further show that primary qualities are mind-
dependent: “Large and small, and fast and slow, are generally agreed to exist only in the mind. 
That is because they are entirely relative: whether something is large or small, and whether it 
moves quickly or slowly, depends on the condition or location of the sense-organs of the 
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perceiver.”56 The relativity of all primary qualities does seem to provide further support for them 
being mind-dependent, and people experience these types of relativity every day. Gary Hatfield, 
in his book Perception & Cognition, explains in detail how Berkeley changed the way of 
thinking about the specific primary quality of distance: 
He began from a point that was shared by intromission theorists, that distance is not 
“immediately sensed,” but must be perceived via other cues or sources of information, 
whether contained in the optical pattern or received collaterally. In Berkeley’s terms, 
since distance is not directly perceived, it must be perceived “by means of some other 
idea.” From there, he mounted a frontal assault on the widely shared theory that distance 
is perceived via “lines and angles,” as when distance is allegedly perceived via reasoning 
using the angle-side-angle relation of a triangle and the perceived convergence of the 
eyes, or using the known size of the object together with perceived visual angle. 
Berkeley’s argument unfolded in two steps. First, he maintained that “no idea which is 
not itself perceived can be the means for perceiving any other idea.” Second, he denied 
that we are ever aware of “lines and angles” in visual perception: “In vain shall all the 
mathematicians in the world tell me that I perceive certain lines and angles which 
introduce into my mind the various ideas of distance so long as I myself am conscious of 
no such thing.” He explained the perception of distance by means of several cues, 
including: (1) the interposition of numerous objects between the viewer and the target 
object, (2) faintness of the target, (3) visible magnitude in the relation to known size, (4) 
height in visual field (objects further off are typically higher in the field of vision but 
below the horizon), and (5) the muscular sensation accompanying the rotation of the eyes 
during convergence.57 
 
Through these challenges of how people perceive such things as distance, Berkeley made 
popular the understanding that people “learn to see.”58 Another argument Berkeley uses to 
support this is his so called “Master Argument.” In this argument he challenges people to 
conceive of any object that is completely independent and unperceived by any mind. He argues 
that this cannot be done since if a person conceives of an object, then they perceive it, too. 
Matthew Densley explains that this argument claims, “[W]e can no more conceive of something 
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existing unconceived than we can see something unseen.”59 Cowan and Spiegel explain that 
Berkeley responds to John Locke’s understanding of matter as being something “I know not 
what” with this argument that “we cannot even imagine an unperceived physical object.”60 They 
argue, “To try to imagine anything is to entertain certain qualities of the thing, but by definition 
Lockean substance itself has no qualities but lies beneath them. So Berkeley concludes that the 
very notion of material substance is ‘repugnant.’”61 These two authors outline Berkeley’s 
argument in the following form: “1. Physical objects are nothing but collections of perceivable 
qualities. 2. Perceivable qualities are essentially ideas. 3. Ideas are mind-dependent—they exist 
only when perceived. 4. Therefore, physical objects exist only when perceived.”62 They argue 
that this argument is in a valid form and they agree with Berkeley that “sense experience 
discloses to us nothing in any physical object beyond its color, texture, shape, taste, odor, and so 
on. Moreover, the perceiver relativity of such things as size, density, temperature, sweetness, and 
other qualities further reinforces the premise.”63 They also clarify that for Berkeley and many 
philosophers, the term “idea,” “encompasses sensory impressions, bodily sensations, and mental 
images. Thus understood, perceivable qualities clearly fall under the category of ‘ideas.’”64 
Berkeley has made several persuasive arguments that there are no such things as mind-
independent objects, but what is it that provides the harmony whereby all people experience 
                                                
59 Matthew J. Densley, "The Fundamental View of Idealism," Linguistic And Philosophical Investigations 7 
(January 2008), 126. 
60 Cowan and Spiegel, 2. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 2-3. 
63 Ibid., 3. 
64 Ibid. 
	 24 
	
similar things?  
 Berkeley has shown that sensible things cannot exist outside of a mind or spirit and thus 
concludes that sensible things have no real existence (i.e., they do not exist on their own).65 Since 
there is a consistency and law like nature surrounding this sensible world, it then makes sense 
that an infinite mind must be orchestrating it all. Berkeley states, “As sure as the sensible world 
really exists, therefore, so sure is there an infinite, omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports 
it.”66 From this Berkeley makes the following argument for God’s existence: 1. Sensible things 
exist. 2. If sensible things exist, they must be perceived by an infinite mind. 3. Therefore, there is 
an infinite mind, or God.67 Another argument is found in the Dialogues, where Berkeley declares 
that “there are only perceiving things and perceived things; or that every unthinking being is 
necessarily—from the very nature of its existence—perceived by some mind, if not by any finite 
created mind then certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom ‘we live, and move, and have 
our being.’”68 As Cowan and Spiegel explain, “The only true substances are spirits, and these 
come in two forms: infinite and finite. The infinite spirit is God, the source of all else that exists. 
And finite spirits include humans, angels, and whatever other finite, perceiving minds God has 
made.”69 God’s mind is like the capstone of Berkeley’s system. It is what provides the stability 
and order of everything in his world. As Dunham, Grant, and Watson state, “It is God’s will that 
these ideas should appear in the individual mind as they do. God determines that they should 
appear constantly, and consistently, in certain orders and with certain connections. It is this order 
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and connection that we call nature.”70 Or as John Foster explains it in his system: 
[T]he world is something whose existence is constitutively sustained by three factors: 
first, the sensory organization, which disposes sensory experience to conform to its 
world-suggestive pattern; second, the relevant endowments of the human mind, which 
make us empirically receptive to the orderly character of our sensory experiences, and 
thereby enable the sensory organization to dispose things to appear systematically 
worldwise at our empirical viewpoint; third, the ordaining role of God, which provides 
the right kind of objective underpinning for the way in which things are disposed to 
empirically appear.71 
 
Berkeley’s notion that everything in the world is made of the same substance, “mind,” and is a 
collection of sensible properties emerging from God, is altogether simpler than a dualistic 
explanation. 
 Simplicity has long been considered a theoretical virtue in philosophy.72 The 
philosophical argument for simplicity is stated well through Occam’s razor: “Don't multiply 
entities beyond necessity.” This belief that simpler theories are preferred over more complicated 
ones is something any philosophical system should strive for. Two common aspects of simplicity 
are elegance and parsimony. The former is known as syntactic simplicity and deals with the 
number and complexity of hypotheses. The later is known as ontological simplicity and deals 
with the number and complexity of things postulated.73 Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant all hold to 
this principle. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Kant “supports the maxim 
that ‘rudiments or principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied (entia praeter necessitatem 
non esse multiplicanda)’ and argues that this is a regulative idea of pure reason which underlies 
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scientists' theorizing about nature.”74 When applied to metaphysical systems, this principle of 
pure reason seems to favor the monistic philosophies. So, Occam’s razor provides support in 
favor of idealism at least when compared to dualism, since idealism has fewer hypotheses and 
things postulated. Idealism is simpler because it only has one substance and thus there is no 
interaction problem. In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz says the following regarding the 
simplicity of his view: 
Admittedly, whatever God does costs him nothing even less than it costs a philosopher or 
scientist to invent theories out of which to build his imaginary world, for God can bring a 
real world into existence merely by decreeing it. But in the exercise of wisdom by God or 
a scientist there is something analogous to the cost of a building, namely the number of 
independent decrees or theories that are involved. For God’s creative activity to be 
economical is for it to involve very few separate decrees; for a scientific theory to be 
economical in its means is for it to have very few basic principles or axioms. Reason 
requires that multiplicity of hypotheses or principles be avoided, rather as the simplest 
system is always preferred in astronomy.75  
 
Leibniz essentially argues that just as it costs a philosopher nothing to come up with ideas, so too 
it costs God nothing to come up with the world. The mere thought of bringing about a world is 
enough for God to manifest one. He does not need to first make a separate substance before He 
can create a world. Berkeley argues the same point in the Dialogues when he says: “How can 
you suppose that an all-perfect Spirit, on whose will all things absolutely and immediately 
depend, would need an instrument in his operations, or that he would use one if he didn’t need it? 
Thus, it seems to me, you have to admit that it would be incompatible with the infinite perfection 
of God for him to use a lifeless inactive instrument such as matter is supposed to be.”76 It 
certainly seems possible that an omnipotent God would not need a substance other than mind to 
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manifest a world for His creation. If a separate substance were not needed, then why would God 
use one? Having a metaphysical system entirely of one substance is the most elegant and 
parsimonious theory. God is able to provide the tangible world for his creatures most directly in 
a monistic system. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain, “God has no need of matter as an 
instrument for implanting his ideas into our minds. He can do it directly, without any pointless 
mediation. The rules of the ‘exhibition’ of things to us are the ‘laws of nature’ determined by 
God.”77 Foster argues that “if God does not need to employ a causal intermediary in order to be 
able to control and organize our sensory experiences in the requisite way, it seems, at the face of 
it, odd if he should choose to do so, rather than take the ontologically simpler course of 
controlling and organizing them directly.”78 Foster clarifies that it would not be any extra effort 
on the part of God to implement this more complex creation, but “granted that God can achieve 
his purposes for human experience without a mechanistic intermediary, it would seem 
pointlessly cumbersome for him to introduce one; and we can surely be confident that a perfectly 
rational God would not gratuitously add to the realm of reality in that way.”79 Cowan and 
Spiegel also believe, “given the existence of God, the supposition of a material substratum is not 
necessary. Why theorize about an unknown, unthinking stuff supporting the perceivable qualities 
we experience when an all-knowing, all-powerful deity is more than sufficient to account for 
this?”80 A helpful analogy for understanding how God can make a tangible world with only the 
substance of mind would be dreams. 
 Every night people experience tangible realities in their dreams, yet one would not say 
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that the physical material they experience in dreams is independent of mind. For certainly 
dreams take place in the mind and there is no actual physical substance in the mind. Yet people 
experience all five senses in dreams with clarity and a firm sense of realness. The things people 
experience in dreams are some of the following but not limited to: taste, smell, touch, sound, 
sight, pain, tangibility, fear, long durations of time, and communications with others. The dream 
world seems to incorporate everything that reality does, yet one would not say that the dream 
world contains matter, since dreams exist completely in the mind. Since the mind is capable of 
producing a tangible reality in the dream world, then how much more so would God’s mind be 
capable of creating a tangible reality for His creation? God’s infinite mind would certainly be 
capable of creating an entire reality that people can live in without actually needing to create the 
separate substance of matter. The reality that people experience in this world is tangible in the 
Berkeleyan sense alluded to earlier of being sensible. This sensibility that God provides for 
people creates a tangible world for them to experience much like people’s minds provide them 
within the dream world. It can also be seen how God’s infinite mind and creation would have 
natural laws that govern this reality stemming from His nature. In a dream world it is left to the 
human’s imagination to create what he or she sees and experiences, and it can be surprising how 
detailed a dream can be, given humans’ finite minds. Thus, it would make sense for the fine 
details of this existence, as discovered in science, to exist in God’s mind since He would have 
thought of exactly how this world would function under His laws for it. Thus, perhaps this 
existence is something similar to a sensible or tangible holographic universe provided by God, in 
which matter does not exist as a separate substance, but instead there is the sensible that we 
experience as matter. If reality is actually like this, unbeknownst to the majority of people, then 
this discovery will truly be similar to the Copernican revolution, as Kant claimed with his 
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transcendental idealism. 
 
Immanuel Kant 
 
 Kant argued that his explanation of how the world operates would drastically change the 
way people think. The revolution he was proposing is just as significant as when Copernicus 
realized that the stars were not orbiting around the observer, but rather the Earth was the body 
circulating. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggests, “[I]n metaphysics we can try the same 
idea as applied to the intuition of objects. If our intuition has to conform to the constitution of the 
objects, I don’t see how we can know anything about them a priori; but I can easily conceive of 
having a priori knowledge of objects if they (as objects of the senses) have to conform to the 
constitution of our faculty of intuition.”81 Kant clarifies that the above is the first part of his 
Copernican revolution and that the second half is:  
If the intuitions I have been talking about are to constitute knowledge of anything, there 
must be more here than just intuitions; I’ll have to take them to be representations of 
something that is their object—i.e. what they are intuitions of —and my conclusions 
about what the object is like must come through those representations. Any beliefs I 
reach about what an object is like will involve me in using concepts of it.82  
 
It can be seen how this theme of relativity from the perspective of the observer has been in most 
of the idealistic teachings and is right here in Kant’s work as well. He provides the example that 
if one were to think of something as solid, one has to project one’s concept of solidity on it.83 
Kant also argues that space and time are better understood as filters through which people 
perceive. Redding summarizes this transcendental ideality thesis of space and time in the 
following way: “What we experience as the basic features of space (its tri-dimensionality) and of 
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time (its ‘one-way’ directionality from past to future) are not features of what space and time are 
like ‘in themselves,’ but rather result from the way that the mind ‘represents’ objects and events 
in its experience.”84 Now, Kant should not be misinterpreted to mean that the observer creates 
his or her own reality. Redding makes this clear in the following: 
While Aristotle seemed to consider the categories as telling us something about things 
(primary substances) “in themselves,” from Kant’s reversed Copernican point of view, 
these categories reflect the logical structure of our cognition of things— their 
fundamental conceptual form. That is, while Aristotle thinks our talk and thought 
realistically reflect the form objects actually have, Kant thinks of the form as projected 
onto the objects in our judging them…. [M]uch of what Kant calls the Transcendental 
Analytic is concerned with this reversal of Aristotle’s approach to the categories. The 
basic idea seems to be that we bring the categorical structure of the understanding to the 
objects we perceive in the same way as we do the “pure intuitions” of space and time to 
those objects. The focus here is on the form of objects we encounter and make judgments 
about in perceptual experience.85 
 
Copleston also makes this clarification as he explains, “To put the matter crudely, we no more 
create things according to their ontological existence than the man who wears red-tinted 
spectacles creates the things which he sees. If we assume that the spectacles can never be 
detached… the man will never see things except as red, and their appearance will be due to a 
factor in the perceiving subject.”86 Rather than people creating their own reality, it is God who 
creates the world and people who perceive it through their senses. According to Copleston, the 
divine intellect is both intuitive and archetypal. 87 He explains that “the divine intuition creates its 
objects. But this is not the case with human intuition, which presupposes an object. And this 
means that the human subject must be affected by the object in some way. Now, the capacity for 
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receiving the representations (Vorstellungen) of objects by being affected by them is named 
‘sensibility’ (Sinnlichkeit).”88 Kant believed that one perceives objects through sensibility, but 
that one cannot know the object directly.  
 Densley explains, “[W]hile nothing can be known of the thing-in-itself, the elusive reality 
beyond the subjective conditions of experience, this should not be taken to deride the knowledge 
of ‘mere phenomena’ that we gain through experience. Kant’s philosophy involves a rejection of 
the separation of the world as it is from our experience of it.”89 Kant argues that appearances and 
objects are not separate; rather they can only be understood as in relation to one another. Densley 
reports that the world is necessarily capable of being experienced by people, but they can only 
describe appearances if they are of an objective world.90 Haldar identifies the following six 
stages in the development of Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself: 
First, it comes before us as the unknown cause of our sensuous affections. Then it is the 
unnavigated ocean that bounds the island of the world of experience. Next, it is the 
regulative idea which imparts unity to our experience. Next, it is the analogue of the unity 
of self-consciousness. Next, it is the unconditioned background of sensible phenomena 
and the sum total of the intelligible causes to which series of changes are referred. And, 
finally, it is the ens realissimum, the perceptive understanding “that thinks in intuitive 
ideas in some such way as the creative genius thinks in images.” The “thing-in-itself,” in 
its ultimate development, is no other than God who, in the words of Paulsen, “is the 
primeval cause of the possibility of all being, out of which that of every entity must be 
regarded as derived by limitation; so that there is no entity which would not be posited in 
God's being.”91 
 
Haldar also argues that Kant’s system is a combination of Plato and Leibniz’s philosophy. 
Furthermore, he contends that Kant never rejected any of the ideas that he would have seen in the 
Baumgarten textbook, such as the following explanation of reality: “[I]n contradistinction to 
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sensibility, is a system of monads which are joined in a unity by means of pre-established 
harmony or an influxus idealis, like that which exists between the parts of a construction of 
thought or a poem. The ultimate ground of the unity of things is their radical unity in God's being, 
while bodies, on the contrary, are merely phenomena substantiate.”92 Kant did reject Leibniz’s 
pre-established harmony,93 but he certainly believed that the unity of things is grounded in God. 
Kant also agreed with Leibniz’s argument that matter cannot be the metaphysical foundation of 
reality because matter is composed of smaller and smaller parts.  
Kant makes a similar argument to that of Leibniz’s in his Inaugural Dissertation. He 
challenges his readers:  
Start with something x that is substantial and composite, and analyse it into its simpler 
elements; this process doesn’t come to an end until we reach a part that is not a whole 
made up of simpler parts, i.e. until we reach something simple. The opposite process of 
synthesising—combining x with other substances—doesn’t come to an end until we 
reach something that isn’t a part of anything bigger, i.e. until we reach a world.94  
 
This is where one can see Kant searching for the true metaphysical foundation of the world. He 
also argues that the aim of reason is not to disregard the phenomena one experiences in deference 
to that which precedes them in an endless chain of causation or a whole of interconnected parts. 
Instead, reason should prompt one to trace the whole system of things all the way to an ultimate 
principle.95 Haldar explains why this should be the aim of reason:  
The reason for this demand of reason is to be found in what, according to Kant, are the 
necessary conditions of experience itself. The purely analytical unity of the self makes 
experience possible by introducing its own unity into the differences of sense, and in 
doing so becomes synthetic. By means of its synthetic activity it constitutes the objective 
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world in distinction from which it becomes conscious of itself as a unity. In this way, 
however, it so to speak loses the purity of its nature, viz., its undifferentiated unity with 
itself. To realize such a unity, therefore, becomes its ideal.96  
 
The second Idea of Reason that this gives rise to, Haldar explains, is the conception of the world 
as an unconditioned whole. This is so because although unity had been introduced to the sense, 
its difference could not be completely overcome. Thirdly, the unity of the self vis-à-vis the world 
advocates a complete reconciled unity.97 Thus, Haldar says that the three Ideas of Reason “arise 
from the very nature of human knowledge. As Kant says, ‘There is in the progression from our 
knowledge of ourselves (the soul) to a knowledge of the world and through it to a knowledge of 
the Supreme Being something so natural that it looks like the logical progression of reason from 
premises to conclusion.’”98 Thus, there is another direct connection to God in Kant, at least in 
how he understands the origin and nature of reason. The intentions Kant has for his system seem 
to have been in the right direction, but his system is certainly not flawless.  
 
Critique of Kant 
 
Kant left such a strong legacy with his Copernican revolution that any major idealists (or 
philosopher in general) seems to have to at least respond to his system. As Dunham, Grant, and 
Watson explain: 
 Whole generations had struggled and failed to provide a convincing 
philosophical account of how subject and object could be connected. How could there be 
a relation between the physical world and knowledge of the physical world in the (non-
physical) mind? Kant thought he had solved the problem by making the world of 
empirical objects a “construct” of the human cognitive apparatus. There was no problem 
of linkage between the object and the subject, because the object was, he said, simply a 
construction of the cognitive “faculties” of “rational” subjects. All that “objectivity” 
                                                
96 Haldar, 382. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
	 34 
	
means to a Kantian is that we share an “object” world by virtue of the cognitive 
similarities that we share as “rational beings.” As we have seen, this created all kinds of 
new problems. The idealists who followed Kant were acutely aware of these. Their 
solution was, in a sense, the reverse of Kant’s. They insisted, like Spinoza, that there can 
only be one substance, and that the material and the mental must both be manifestations 
of a single more fundamental substance. This single substance, said Hegel, is the Idea. 
Both matter and mind are functional attributes of the unfolding of the total system that is 
the Idea.99 
 
Hegel was another famous idealist that came on the scene shortly after Kant. Hegel argued that 
there is only one substance, the Idea (or consciousness or spirit). In fact, his system points so 
strongly in this direction that many have labeled him a pantheist or panentheist. However, he 
does provide a few insights in his critique of Kant. According to Dunham, Grant, and Watson, 
“Hegel argues that Kant’s concept of knowing, which hinges on the unity of the subject, cannot 
be a knowing because it is contradictory: it is not a knowing of what is (reality), but a knowing 
of what cannot be known (the thing-in-itself).”100 This idea in Kant’s system of the thing-in-itself 
being separate from the knowing subject is one of the main flaws in his system according to 
Hegel and others. Sally Sedgwick explains that Hegel believed Kant does not entertain the 
possibility that rather than “‘absolutely separate,’ ‘the moment of the atom is contained in 
continuity itself.’ Kant does not consider this possibility, Hegel suggests in the Enclyopaedia 
Logic, because of his more general failure to appreciate that ‘antinomy finds itself… in all 
objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts and ideas’” 101 Thus, Sedgwick argues, “In 
taking for granted that the concepts of discreteness and continuity must be understood as 
‘absolutely separate,’ Kant thus reveals his commitment to ‘finite categories.’”102 Although 
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Hegel’s dialectical system may lead to panentheism the way that he lays it out, it does hold a 
resolution to the mind-body problem. Dunham, Grant, and Watson explain, “Hegel solves the 
problem of the duality of mind and body by making them both manifestations of the Idea 
itself.”103 According to Haldar, the central idea of Hegel’s philosophy is “the conception of the 
ultimate reality as a system of minds in which an all-inclusive spiritual principle is realized.”104 
This universality in Hegel’s philosophy seems to be a strong point because it unites everything 
into a monistic system that is connected to God. Kant’s system seems flawed in the sense that it 
separates the thing-in-itself from the perceiver. The importance of a unitary system will be 
examined more in the next chapter. 
 Heisenberg also offers a critique of Kant’s philosophy, specifically against his causal law. 
He explains that Grete Hermann and Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker engaged in a discussion with 
him on this topic. Hermann tried to argue that Kant’s causal law was “unshakable.”105 In 
response to this, Heisenberg used the illustration of a single atom of Radium B to explain that 
“we cannot—and this is where the causal law breaks down—explain why a particular atom will 
decay at one moment and not at the next, or what causes it to emit an electron in precisely this 
direction rather than that. And we are convinced, for a variety of reasons, that no such cause 
exists.”106 Hermann reasoned that the cause must simply be undiscovered and that they should 
keep searching for it. However, Heisenberg replied, “No, we think that we have found all there is 
to be found in this field… for from other experiments with Radium B we know that there are no 
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determinants beyond those we have established. Let me put it more precisely: we have just said 
that it is impossible to tell in which direction an electron will be emitted, and you tell us to keep 
looking for further factors.”107 Heisenberg goes on to explain several other difficulties that would 
arise even if such factors could be found. However, Friedrich joined the discussion by saying 
that “[t]he apparent contradiction … probably arises because we behave as if a Radium B atom 
were a ‘thing-in-itself,’ a Kantian ‘Ding an sich.’ But this is by no means self-evident or correct. 
Even Kant treated the ‘Ding an sich’ as a problematical concept.”108 He went on to explain, “In 
atomic physics we have learned that observations can no longer be correlated or arranged on the 
model of the ‘Ding an sich.’ Hence there is also no ‘Radium B atom in itself.’”109 Furthermore, 
Friedrich claimed, “In quantum theory we have to use a new method of objectifying perceptions, 
one that Kant would never have dreamt of in his philosophy. Every perception refers to an 
observational situation that must be specified if experience is to result. The consequence of a 
perception can no longer be objectified in the manner of classical physics.”110 Heisenberg 
similarly argued, “Kant could not possibly have foreseen that in an experimental realm so far 
beyond daily experience we could no longer treat observations as if they referred to ‘Ding an 
sich’ or ‘objects;’ in other words, he could not foresee that atoms are neither things nor 
objects.”111 Hermann then probed Heisenberg for an explanation as to what atoms are, to which 
he replied, “We lack the right term, for our language is based on daily experience, and atoms are 
not. But… we might say that atoms are parts of observational situations, parts that have a high 
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explanatory value in the physical analysis of the phenomena involved.”112 The next chapter will 
examine such phenomena in more detail.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Support from Quantum Physics and Psychology 
 
 
Quantum physics (or mechanics) has tremendously affected the philosophical and 
scientific understanding of reality since its discovery in the past century. There have been many 
interesting discoveries and experiments made at the quantum level, resulting in several different 
interpretations. The role of consciousness in quantum physics has seriously challenged the 
materialistic view that scientists so desperately want to hang onto. Daniel Dennett, author of 
Consciousness Explained, is one of the many leading proponents of materialism and is in 
agreement with the majority of scientists and philosophers who believe that consciousness can 
still be explained in materialistic terms even in light of quantum physics. One of Dennett’s 
reasons for rejecting dualism is that it violates the principle of conservation of energy—that any 
change in the trajectory of a particle is an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy. 
Henry Stapp, who received his Ph.D. in particle physics and went on to study directly under 
Wolfgang Pauli and later Heisenberg, disagrees with Dennett. Stapp explains that Dennett’s 
argument “collapses when one goes over to contemporary physics, in which, due to the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, trajectories of particles are replaced by cloud-like structures, 
and in which conscious choices can influence physically described activity without violating the 
conservation laws or any other laws of quantum physics.” 113 Thus, Stapp argues, “Contemporary 
physical theory allows, and its orthodox von Neumann form entails, an interactive dualism that 
is fully in accord with all the laws of physics.”114 This chapter will elaborate on these ideas and 
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show how quantum physics is supportive of consciousness being a real and independent 
substance (i.e. not material in nature). Now, Stapp will label his view as dualistic; however, it 
seems to be more idealistic in a philosophical sense. For instance, he says, “Descartes’ 
identification of two different ‘substances’ in one reality is neither helpful for nor concordant 
with quantum theory. However, the conception of two differently described aspects of reality 
accords with both the theoretical and practical elements of quantum theory.”115 He clarifies his 
view by saying that “both sides of the quantum duality are conceptually more like ‘ideas’ than 
like ‘rocks.’”116 The descriptions Stapp gives of this “duality” seem to be more in line with 
monistic idealism. Of course there is a duality that everyone experiences of mind and matter. 
However, these should be considered more as different aspects of reality, rather than two 
separate substances. Heisenberg also supports this principle. In an interview with Heisenberg, 
Ruth Nanda Anshen posed the following question to him: “You have always emphasized, Dr. 
Heisenberg… that when you speak of waves or particles you do not refer to a dualistic 
description of the phenomena but rather to an absolutely unitary one. Am I correct in thus 
interpreting your meaning as far as I understand it? ‘Yes,’ answered Heisenberg.”117 Furthermore, 
Jeffery Schwartz, M.D., who has shown that the mind can influence the brain through his work 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients and the co-author of The Mind and the 
Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force, argues similarly to Stapp by saying that 
“the view of reality demanded by quantum physics challenged the validity of the Cartesian 
separation of mind and material world, for in the quantum universe ‘there is no radical separation 
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between mind and world.’”118 These are the very same ideas that monistic idealism is arguing for. 
Schwartz mentions that “Wolfgang Pauli stated in a letter to Niels Bohr in 1955, ‘In quantum 
mechanics… an observation here and now changes in general the ‘state’ of the observed 
system…. I consider the unpredictable change of the state by a single observation… to be an 
abandonment of the idea of the isolation of the observer from the course of physical events 
outside himself.’”119 Thus, some of the very founders of quantum physics were having some of 
the same realizations about reality through science that philosophers such as Leibniz, Berkeley, 
and Kant were having through philosophy hundreds of years prior. They both tend to begin with 
the basic idea that Cartesian dualism fails. Schwartz states, “This is the textbook position on 
quantum mechanics and the nature of reality: that the Cartesian separation of mind and matter 
into two intrinsically different ‘substances’ is false.”120 This separation of reality into two 
separate substances causes many problems in metaphysics, such as the mind-body problem.  
Schwartz points out, “The very origin of the mind-brain problem lies in a physics that has 
been outdated for almost a century.”121 He goes on to argue that if this problem has “resisted 
resolution for three centuries, it is because the physical theory that scientists and philosophers 
have wielded is fundamentally incorrect. If we are foundering in our attempts to resolve the 
mind-matter problem, the fault lies with the physics more than with the philosophy or the 
neuroscience.” 122 He elaborates that “we are not doing all that badly in our efforts to understand 
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the mind side of the equation; it’s our understanding of the role of matter that is seriously off.”123 
The classical Newtonian physics has been replaced with quantum physics and this updated 
understanding of the universe has consciousness as a key factor that is no longer being denied as 
simply a phenomenon of the brain. Some of the discoveries in quantum physics are pointing 
towards an idealistic understanding of reality. For example, Schwartz says that quantum physics 
“describes a world that often seems to have parted company with common sense, a world at odds 
with some of our strongest intuitive notions about how things work. In the quantum world, 
subatomic particles have no definite position until they are measured: the electron orbiting the 
nucleus of an atom is not the pointlike particle we usually imagine.”124 This parting from the 
typical common sense notions that one has about reality echoes the very thoughts of Berkeley. 
Schwartz declares that the advances “in physics have occurred when scientists united two 
seemingly disparate entities into a coherent, logical whole. Newton connected celestial motions 
with terrestrial motion. Maxwell unified light and electromagnetism. Einstein did it for space and 
time. Quantum theory makes exactly this kind of connection, between the objective physical 
world and subjective experiences.”125 Idealist thinkers have been trying to unite the physical 
world with subjective experiences for centuries; have they finally found support in science?  
 Quantum physics certainly seems to be supportive of these ideas. However, there are 
many different interpretations of quantum physics. Schwartz explains,  
During a period of feverishly intense creativity in the 1920s, the greatest minds in physics, 
from Paul Dirac and Niels Bohr to Albert Einstein and Werner Heisenberg, struggled to 
explain the results of quantum experiments. Finally, at the fifth Solvay Congress of 
physics in Brussels 1927, one group—Bohr, Max Born, Paul Dirac, Werner Heisenberg, 
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and Wolfgang Pauli—described an accord that would become known as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation of quantum mechanics.126  
 
This has been the leading interpretation of quantum physics and this chapter will stay in 
agreement with it. Does this interpretation of quantum physics support a general theory of 
idealism? Amit Goswami, Ph.D. in Theoretical Nuclear Physics from the University of Calcutta, 
who served as a Physics professor at the University of Oregon from 1968-1997, argues that it 
does in his article, “The Idealistic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” The support is best 
seen in the following three aspects of quantum physics that will be examined: the implications of 
the Copenhagen interpretation, the role of a conscious observer in the collapse of the wave 
function, and the connections seen in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox showing the 
nonlocality (transcendental-ness) of quantum physics.  
 
The Copenhagen Interpretation 
 
Stephen Palmquist, author of the article “Kantian Causality and Quantum Quarks: The 
Compatibility between Quantum Mechanics and Kant's Phenomenal World,” reminds people that 
the Copenhagen interpretation is the most widely accepted interpretation of quantum physics and 
emerged from discussions held in Copenhagen between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in 
1926-27.127 Palmquist explains that the different interpretations of quantum physics can be 
categorized by their answers to the following two questions: “(A) Is the quantum world 
characterized by randomness (i.e. indeterminacy)? And (B) Is the quantum world characterized 
by nonlocality (i.e., action at a distance)?”128 He argues that the Copenhagen interpretation 
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“accepts both randomness and nonlocality. It reconciles these by means of the ‘projection 
postulate,’ whereby the act of measurement (i.e., ‘observation’) randomly projects a particle’s 
original state onto a new ‘eigenstate.’”129 Particles, as will be seen throughout this chapter, are 
best understood as waves or clouds of possibilities rather than material particles. Measuring a 
particle (determining one of its observables) projects it onto an eigenstate, which is in a sense a 
more reduced wave of possibilities since one of the observables is known but not the others. 
Goswami explains, “In consciousness coherent superpositions are transcendent objects. The 
subject to consciousness chooses one of the facets of the multifaceted coherent superposition 
when it brings it down to immanence by conscious observation, subject of course to the 
probability constraints of the quantum calculus.”130 Palmquist makes a parallel between Kant’s 
theory of reality and quantum physics. The parallel is that in Kant’s theory, it is not the object 
that affects the observer, but the observer that affects the object. Also, similar to how Kant 
theorized that one cannot know anything about the noumenal world, so too can one not know 
much about the quantum world (uncertainty principle).131 Thus, already there seems to be 
support from quantum physics for idealism in the Kantian transcendental sense. 
To say that quantum physics supports idealism is a powerful claim that needs to be well 
supported. Thus, a proper understanding of quantum physics is essential. Stapp provides the 
following explanation for what “orthodox quantum theory” is: 
[V]ersions of quantum theory (such as the original pragmatic Copenhagen 
interpretation, validated by actual scientific practice, and also von Neumann’s extension 
of it) … that explicitly recognize the fact that, prior to the appearance of an experimental 
outcome, a particular experiment needs to be set up. This “setting up” partitions a 
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continuum of quantum potentialities into a finite set of discrete possibilities. A simple 
example of such a partitioning is the placing of a detector of some particular size and 
shape in some particular location. The distinction between the firing and non-firing of 
this detector during some specified temporal interval then induces a bifurcation of a 
continuous space of potentialities into two subspaces, each correlated with a distinctive 
event, or lack thereof.  
 Von Neumann referred to this essential physical act of portioning as “process 1” 
and represented it in terms of projections onto different subspaces. Quantum theory 
depends upon the injection of such process 1 interventions into the dynamical evolution 
of the state of the system under study, which, except at the moments of these 
interventions, is controlled by the Schrödinger equation (which von Neumann called 
“process 2”). An adequate theory of nature must accommodate physical process 1 actions 
even in situations in which no human agent seems to be involved. These interventions 
into the physical dynamics are perhaps the most radical innovation of quantum theory, 
vis-à-vis classical physics.132  
 
This chapter will stay within the realm of orthodox quantum theory and the ideology of the 
Copenhagen interpretation. Metaphysical and ontological implications of these theories will be 
discussed. For instance, Stapp explains that in quantum theory “actual occasions actualize what 
was antecedently merely potential, but both the potential and the actual are real in an ontological 
sense. A key feature of actual occasions is that they are conceived as ‘becomings’ rather than 
‘beings'—they are not substances such as Descartes’ res extensa and res cogitans, or material and 
mental states: they are processes.”133 He further explains the important ontological characteristic 
of the “‘physical’ aspect of quantum theory, namely the part described in terms of a wave 
function or quantum state, is that of a ‘potentia’ or ‘tendency’ for an event to happen. Tendencies 
for events to happen are not substance-like: they are not static or persisting in time.” 134 Stapp 
further explains, “When a detection event happens in one region, the objective tendency for such 
an event to occur elsewhere changes abruptly. Such behavior does not conform to the 
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philosophical conception of a substance.”135 Rather than using quantum theory for just 
mathematics like many physicists do, it is important to explore the philosophical implications of 
the theory. Stapp explains: 
In order to have a useful scientific theory one needs to link the mathematics to the 
perceptual aspects of our experience. The mathematical structure of quantum theory is 
such that the classical materialist accounts of the physical aspects of nature simply do not 
work. To achieve a conceptualization that ties the new mathematics to actual empirical 
scientific practice, in a rationally coherent and practically useful way, the founders of 
quantum theory switched to a conceptualization of the physical world based upon 
empirical events, such as the click of a Geiger counter, and upon potentialities for such 
events to occur. The mathematics thereby becomes linked to empirical phenomena within 
the theory itself.136  
 
This demonstrates why it is important to study the science and philosophy side by side. 
 
Goswami outlines several main principal elements of the Copenhagen interpretation that 
Bohr, the father of the Copenhagen interpretation, had in mind. One of these elements is that 
“[q]uantum objects are governed by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle – that it is impossible 
to simultaneously measure pairs of conjugate variables such as position and momentum.”137 
Another of these elements is the complementarity principle of Bohr, which states that quantum 
objects have a complementary wave-particle duality.138 Goswami provides another element of 
the Copenhagen interpretation with this summary: “Discontinuity and quantum jumps are 
fundamental aspects of the behavior of quantum systems. For example, a measurement leads to a 
discontinuous collapse of the state function of a system from a coherent superposition to an 
eigenstate of the observable being measured.”139 Another element is “inseparability,” which 
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states that quantum systems cannot coherently be separated from their measuring apparatuses.140 
Bohr also provides the complementarity principle, which states that the wave and particle aspects 
“of a quantum object are complementary; yet for a single quantum object, the wave nature never 
manifests; whenever we look we always ‘see’ a quantum object localized, as a particle. This 
opens the door to a transcendental interpretation of complementarity – the wave aspect of a 
quantum object is transcendent; it exists in another domain transcending space-time.”141 
Nonlocality is another key element in the Copenhagen interpretation. This element, examined in 
more detail later, seems to show that the fundamental element of nature lies outside of space-
time yet creates events within space-time. Thus, nonlocal refers to a transcendental state of being 
outside space-time.142 Goswami will couple the Copenhagen interpretation with an idealistic 
philosophy similar to Plato and Kant, in which a realm of consciousness is the source of reality. 
He explains that in this view, quantum objects are “posited to be ‘archetypal,’ a priori; they exist 
in potentia (to use Heisenberg’s term) in this transcendent domain until translated to the manifest 
world of appearance by the discontinuous act of measurement. And the EPR [Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen] nonlocal connection between quantum objects is seen as a connection via the 
transcendent domain of consciousness.”143 Goswami will label his view 
monistic idealism, which considers consciousness to be the primary reality. The world of 
matter is considered to be determined by consciousness as is the subtle world of mental 
phenomena, such as thought. Besides the material and the subtle (which together form the 
immanent reality or the world of appearance), idealism posits a transcendent archetypal 
or ideal realm as the “source” of the lower immanent worlds of appearance of the 
material and the subtle. However, monistic idealism is fundamentally a monistic 
philosophy; any subdivisions such as the three orders above are in consciousness – thus, 
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ultimately, consciousness is the only reality.144 
 
Goswami relates this view to the Allegory of the Cave by Plato. He explains that the shadows in 
this allegory represent the world of appearance, the archetypes represent the transcendent world 
of forms, but in reality light is the real truth and the only thing that everyone really sees. Thus, 
consciousness is like the light in the cave allegory.145 This is similar to what Heisenberg says in 
his book, Natural Law and the Structure of Matter, when comparing the views of Plato and 
Democritus. Heisenberg argues, “[C]oncerning the structure of matter, Plato has come much 
nearer to the truth than Leukippos or Democritus, in spite of the enormous success of the concept 
of the atom in modern science.”146 He later states, “[M]odern physics has definitely decided in 
favor of Plato. In fact these smallest units of matter are not physical objects in the ordinary sense; 
they are forms, ideas which can be expressed unambiguously only in mathematical language.”147  
Heisenberg strongly believed that “[t]he Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory 
has led the physicists far away from the simple materialistic views that prevailed in the natural 
science of the nineteenth century.”148 Heisenberg explained that the materialistic view was so 
grounded in the natural science and philosophical systems that it was so deep in the minds of 
even the common man and that is why many attempts have been made to criticize the 
Copenhagen interpretation and to replace it.149 He provides the insight that all of the opponents 
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of the Copenhagen interpretation would agree on one point: “It would, in their view, be desirable 
to return to the reality concept of classical physics or, to use a more general philosophic term, to 
the ontology of materialism. They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real 
world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, 
independently of whether or not we observe them.”150 However, Heisenberg argues that this 
would be “impossible or at least not entirely possible because of the nature of the atomic 
phenomena…. It cannot be our task to formulate wishes as to how the atomic phenomena should 
be; our task can only be to understand them.”151 He elucidates this idea by explaining that “[t]he 
ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct ‘actuality’ 
of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation is 
impossible, however.”152 J.N. Mohanty argues that the choice of a philosophical system should 
be guided by: “(a) if the scientific results are or are not inconsistent with the theory, and (b) by 
considerations/arguments/insights that are strictly philosophical rather than scientific.”153 He 
further argues that a “certain kind of idealistic philosophy… satisfies both these requirements. CI 
[Copenhagen interpretation], is a good reading of Quantum Mechanics, and an idealistic reading 
of CI, I will argue, satisfies (a), and also has the weight of independent philosophical arguments 
behind it.”154 One of the main elements of the Copenhagen interpretation that expresses the 
idealistic nature of reality is the role of the observer in the collapse of the wave function.  
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The Role of the Observer in the Collapse of the Wave Function 
 Stapp was interested in quantum physics as early as his high school days when he learned 
about the double-slit (or two-slit) experiment and he has been studying the mysteries ever since. 
Like most physicists, Stapp rejected the idea proposed by von Neumann that the mind has 
something to do with creating reality. However, he continued to study what exactly it was that 
changes all of the potentials from the Schrödinger wave function into a single reality.155 Stapp 
explains that he “worked long and hard trying to figure out what led to the collapse of the wave 
function. In the end, I became convinced that conscious experience needed to be taken 
seriously.”156 Consciousness cannot be ignored for quantum physics to work. Wigner explains: 
When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic 
phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness 
came to the fore again: it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics 
without reference to the consciousness. All that quantum mechanics purports to describe 
are probability connections between subsequent impressions (also called 
“apperceptions”) of consciousness, and even though the dividing line between the 
observer, whose consciousness is being affected, and the observed physical object can be 
shifted towards one or the other to a considerable degree, it cannot be eliminated.157   
 
Yet most physicists still try to get around the idea of consciousness by attempting to explain it in 
material terms. Schwartz explains that it does not make sense to describe the mind in “terms of 
the positions of atoms, for one simple reason: the latter are derived from the former and have no 
fixed and non-probabilistic existence outside the former.”158 Wigner argues, “It seems 
inconsistent, therefore, to explain the state of mind of the observer, his apperception of the result 
of an observation, in terms of concepts, such as positions of atoms, which have to be explained, 
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then, in terms of the content of consciousness.”159 Schwartz argues along the lines of Wigner that 
“[i]f the positions of atoms (and thus, for our purposes, the state and arrangement of neurons, 
since neurons are only collections of zillions of atoms) have no unambiguous existence 
independent of the consciousness of an observer… then how can that very consciousness depend 
on those same atoms?”160 Consciousness must be treated as a real and independent substance. 
The reasons for this are best seen in the collapse of Schrödinger’s wave function by the observer.  
 The collapse of the wave function by an observer is illustrated well through the double-
slit experiment. David Hodgson explains that the origin of this experiment comes from Thomas 
Young’s demonstration that the nature of light is more like a wave than a stream of particles. 
Hodgson summarizes this famous double-slit experiment in the following: 
 Monochromatic light from a single source was made to pass through a screen with 
a narrow slit. It was then made to pass through a further screen with two narrow parallel 
slits, close together; and to fall on a further screen. With either of the two slits in the 
middle screen blocked, an oblong patch of light appeared on the third screen. With the 
two slits open, there appeared on the third screen, not a combination or sum of the oblong 
patches, as one would expect if light consisted of a stream of particles; but rather a series 
of light and dark bands. The explanation for this was found in the wave nature of light. 
Where waves (for example, in water) of equal amplitude and wave-length meet, they can 
interfere constructively and destructively. Where the phases of the waves are the same 
where they meet, so that two peaks or two troughs coincide, they reinforce one another, 
and there results a heightened peak or deepened trough. Where the phases of the waves 
where they meet are opposite, so that a peak and trough coincide, they cancel out, leaving 
no wave at that point. The bright centres of the light bands, then, were where the waves 
passing through the two slits interfered constructively so that the light wave was 
intensified; while the centres of the dark bands were where they interfered destructively, 
so that the light was destroyed.161 
 
This experiment has been advanced so that the “source can be turned so low that only one photon 
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[particle of light] will be passing through the screen with the slits at any one time; yet if the 
display screen is prepared so as to be able to detect the arrival of single photons, over time the 
same interference pattern will be built up.”162 A similar experiment can be performed with 
electrons.163 Hodgson explains, “If steps are taken to determine which hole each photon (or 
electron) passed through, it is found that, while measurements to this end can be made, the effect 
of doing so is to destroy the interference pattern.”164 He further explains, “The electron itself, 
then, until detection, is best regarded as a matter of potentialities, of probabilities quantified by 
the state function, that various values of observables such as position will be manifested if an 
appropriate measurement is made (or an appropriate interaction occurs).”165 Hodgson also 
explains that “if the measurement of position cannot determine which slit gave rise to the 
potentiality actualized by the measurement, then in a sense the electron has ‘gone through’ both 
slits.”166 Many physicists, like Goswami, believe that the measurement is an act of conscious 
observation, which is what collapses the wave function. Thus, Goswami will argue that at the 
quantum level an event does not actually take place until it is observed.167  
This is not just a special case of the nature of photons or electrons. Schwartz explains that 
similar experiments have been done with larger particles, “such as ions, with the identical results. 
And ions… are the currency of the brain, the particles whose movements are the basis for the 
action potential by which neurons communicate. They are also, in the case of calcium ions, the 
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key to triggering neurotransmitter release. This is a crucial point: ions are subject to all of the 
counterintuitive rules of quantum physics.”168 In fact, Schwartz quotes Richard Feynman in 
saying that “[a]ny other situation in quantum mechanics, it turns out, can always be explained by 
saying, ‘You remember the case of the experiment with the two holes? It’s the same thing.’”169 
Goswami explains that in the Copenhagen interpretation the “collapse of the wave function upon 
observation (the reduction postulate) is introduced in order to connect theory and experiment, but 
the question of what constitutes a measurement has been left unanswered. And in view of the 
EPR-Bohr nonlocality [next section], the collapse is clearly nonlocal. The ontological 
implication of nonlocal collapse has not been studied.”170 Thus, the standard interpretation 
avoids the explicit role of the subject, but leaves it as a possibility. Goswami points out that the 
cost of leaving the subject out of the Copenhagen interpretation is “the baffling 
quantum/classical dichotomy. This dichotomy finds a straightforward resolution if we assume as 
von Neumann and Wigner have done, that consciousness, the observing subject, collapses the 
state function of a quantum system, not the ‘classical’ measuring apparatus.”171 Two common 
objections to the von Neumann-Wigner hypothesis are the question of mind over matter and 
solipsism. However, Goswami shows that if this hypothesis is interpreted within the framework 
of monistic idealism and its philosophy of consciousness, then the objections are resolved.172 
Thus, it is important to lay out a proper metaphysical system that supports the necessary role of a 
conscious observer in quantum physics.  
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Goswami explains, “Heisenberg clearly saw that the answer to the riddle of the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics lay in Platonic idealism and not in the materialism that 
grew out of the atomistic ideas of Democritus. He envisioned that quantum objects are more like 
Platonic archetypes than billiard balls of Democritus’ vintage.”173 In a discussion about “[w]hat 
happens ‘really’ in an atomic event,” Heisenberg explains that “the term ‘happens’ is restricted 
to the observation. Now, this is a very strange result, since it seems to indicate that the 
observation plays a decisive role in the event and that the reality varies, depending upon whether 
we observe it or not.”174 Heisenberg continues to explain that “[t]he probability function does—
unlike the common procedure in Newtonian mechanics—not describe a certain event but, at least 
during the process of observation, a whole ensemble of possible events.”175 Thus, he concludes 
that “observation itself changes the probability function discontinuously; it selects of all possible 
events the one that has taken place…. Therefore, the transition from ‘possible’ to ‘actual’ takes 
place during the act of observation.”176 As Stapp explains, “Heisenberg tied the mathematically 
described reduction events to the process of ‘observation.’”177  
 The paradox of Schrödinger’s cat is another topic usually discussed within the 
interpretations of quantum physics. Goswami explains this paradox in an idealistic context along 
with Wigner’s resolution of it: “It is our consciousness whose observation of the cat resolves its 
schizophrenic alive-dead dichotomy. Coherent superpositions, the multifaceted quantum waves, 
exist in the never-never land of a transcendent order, until we bring them to the world of 
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appearance with the act of observation.”178 He clarifies that “in the process, we choose one facet 
out of two, or many, that are permitted by the Schrödinger equation; it is a limited choice, to be 
sure, subject to the overall probability constraint of quantum mathematics, but it is choice, 
nevertheless.”179 Within the understanding of monistic idealism, the nature of reality is 
consciousness. Thus, when a particle is in a wave packet of possibilities (or superposition), it is 
within the realm of consciousness. When the observer, through consciousness, chooses 
(knowingly or unknowingly and according to the rules of probability within the quantum 
calculus) an outcome out of the possibilities, he or she collapses the wave function.180 Or as 
Schwartz describes it: “Is the choice made by nature, or the observer? According to the 
Copenhagen interpretation, it is the observer who both decides which aspect of nature is to be 
probed and reads the answer nature gives. The mind of the observer helps choose which of an 
uncountable number of possible realities comes into being in the form of observation.”181 One 
may find it hard to believe that observing something would have such an effect on the physical 
state. Goswami answers this by saying, “[I]n monistic idealism, objects are already in 
consciousness as primordial, transcendent archetypal possibility forms. The collapse is not about 
doing something to objects via observing, but choosing and recognizing the result of choice.”182 
The materialist will argue that the role of consciousness has no effect on the collapse of the wave 
function. Goswami explains that “many physicists, even today, believe that somehow, the cat’s 
wave function never becomes schizophrenic in the first place; somehow the wave function of the 
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atom (which does become schizophrenic; denying that would mean denying quantum mechanics) 
collapses somewhere in between, before its schizophrenia invades the cat.”183 However, the 
materialist is unable to provide a sound explanation of the wave function collapse when they 
exclude the observer. Stapp summarizes by saying: 
[C]lassical physics is now known by physicists to be fundamentally false: it has been 
superseded by quantum theory, which must in principle be used to describe the motions 
of the atoms and ions that underlie the macroscopic processes occurring in our nervous 
system. Classical mechanics is consequently, in principle, not the scientifically correct 
foundation for a treatment of the relationship between the macroscopic processes in our 
brain that are associated with our thoughts and feelings, and those thoughts and feelings 
themselves.  
 The most profound change wrought by the shift from classical physics to quantum 
physics was the introduction into the physical dynamics of certain dynamically essential 
choices that are attributed to human beings, yet are not determined by, or constrained by, 
any known law, statistical or otherwise. These human choices are not the notorious 
quantum random choices, and they seem to us human beings to be, at least in part, 
consequences of our mental aspects. Within the orthodox quantum framework these 
crucial human choices are not determined by any yet-known law, yet they can have 
powerful effects upon the physically described macroscopic behavior of our brains.184  
 
He clarifies a few important aspects in the following: 
It would indeed be misleading to understand the “action of mind upon brain” directly via 
a “force.” The effect is associated with a modulation of the frequency of certain process 1 
actions that act directly upon large-scale (brain-sized) patters of neurological activity. 
This modulation of frequencies is achieved, strictly within the pragmatic framework (that 
is, without any of Whitehead’s ontological superstructure) by exploiting certain human 
“free choices” that are allowed within the pragmatic framework. This language suggests 
that the conscious act is the cause, and the correlated physical process 1 action is the 
effect. This interpretation ties the theory most naturally and directly to actual scientific 
practice. In actual practice the experimental options will be pursued, within the array of 
possibilities that the structure of the physical theory provides. Bohr … spoke, accordingly, 
of “the free choice of experimental arrangement for which the mathematical structure of 
the quantum mechanical formalism offers the appropriate latitude.” We are dealing here 
with the sophisticated way in which mental intention influences quantum processes in the 
brain. Ideas do not simply push classically conceived particles around!185  
                                                
183 Goswami, “Idealistic Interpretation,” 390. 
184 Stapp, 147. 
185 Stapp, 109-110. 
	 56 
	
Not only does quantum physics show the importance of recognizing consciousness as a real 
independent and immaterial substance, it also indicates that conscious beings have a certain 
freedom. Stapp defines a “template for action” as a “macroscopic (extending over a large portion 
of the brain) pattern of neurological activity that, if held in place for a sufficiently long period, 
will tend to produce a brain activity that will tend to produce an intended experienced feedback. 
This pattern of brain activity is the neural correlate (specified by a process 1 action) of a 
conscious effort to act in an intended way.”186 He elaborates on this idea in the following: 
Effort is a particular feature of consciousness that we feel we can control, and that has the 
effect of intensifying experience. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that increasing effort 
increases the rate at which conscious events are occurring. If the rate becomes 
sufficiently great then the quantum Zeno effect will, according to the quantum laws, kick 
in, and the repetitious interventions of the probing actions will tend to hold in place the 
template for action. That effect will, in turn, tend to make the intended action occur. By 
virtue of this dynamically explained causal effect of willful conscious effort upon brain 
activity, trial-and-error learning should hone the correlation between the consciously 
experienced intention and an associated template for action that produces, via the 
physical laws, the intended feedback. This explains dynamically the capacity of an 
effortful intention to bring about its intended consequence.187  
 
Stapp further clarifies, 
[T]he timings of the process 1 actions are an aspect of the “free choice” on the part of the 
human observer. It is therefore plausible to conjecture that the effort-induced increase in 
the intensity of the projected intended experience is caused by an increase in the 
observation-controlled rate at which the associated process 1 actions are occurring. If the 
essentially identical process 1 actions occur in sufficiently rapid succession, then the 
associated neural correlate (i.e. the template for action) will be held in place by the 
quantum Zeno effect. The resulting persistent neural pattern of activity will then tend to 
cause the intended action to occur. The effect of the effort-induced increase in the rate of 
the process 1 probing actions is thus to hold in place the entire macroscopic template for 
action. The dynamical effect, via the neural machinery, of this holding in place is the 
likely occurrence of the intended action.188  
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Stapp explains, “[T]he effect of the effort is on an entire macroscopic neural pattern of brain 
activity.”189 He says, “This pattern has been singled out by von Neumann’s process 1 action and 
is held in place by the quantum Zeno effect. By coupling von Neumann’s dynamical rules to 
learning, one can rationally account for the observed—and essential for human life and 
survival—correspondence between experienced intent and experienced feedback.”190 He 
explains that the causal gap in quantum physics can be filled by “allowing our efforts to do what 
they seem to be doing. Embedded in an adequate ontology, quantum theory has the technical 
capacity to explain how a person’s conscious efforts can influence his or her bodily actions.”191 
Stapp says, “The quantum analog of the classical laws of motion is the Schrödinger equation. It 
determines the evolution of the state of the universe between quantum jumps, not the jumps! And 
the infamous element of ‘quantum randomness’ enters only into the (logically) second choice: 
the choice on the part of ‘nature.’”192 He also admits, “Orthodox theory is totally silent on the 
question of the causal roots of the first choice.”193 Goswami claims, “We know that an 
observation by a conscious observer ends the dichotomy. Thus it is obvious that the act of 
observation must be a jump out of the system, that the subject to consciousness must work from 
outside of the material world; in other words, the subject to consciousness must be 
transcendent.”194 In summary, a conscious observer is needed to make sense of the wave function 
collapse and this points to the realization that consciousness might be the fabric of reality.  
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This certainly echoes the ideas of Leibniz, Kant, and Berkeley. With Berkeley’s system 
in mind, hear again some of the claims from quantum physics. Schwartz says, “Integral to 
quantum physics is the fundamental role played by the observer in choosing which of a plenitude 
of possible realities will leave the realm of the possible and become actual.”195 Furthermore, he 
declares, “Quantum physics makes the seemingly preposterous claim (actually, more than claim, 
since it has been upheld in countless experiments) that there is no ‘is’ until an observer makes an 
observation.”196 John Archibald Wheeler, sounding a lot like Berkeley, said, “No phenomenon is 
a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon.”197 Similarly, the following quote from 
Schwartz sounds familiar to the ideas of Kant:  
Science is what we know, and what we know is only what our observations tell us. It is 
unscientific to ask what is “really” out there, what lies behind the observations. Physical 
laws as embodied in the equations of quantum physics, then, ceased describing the 
physical world itself. They described, instead, our knowledge of that world. Physics 
shifted from an ontological goal—learning what is—to an epistemological one: 
determining what is known, or knowable.198  
 
Stapp once explained to Schwartz that “[i]n quantum theory, experience is the essential reality, 
and matter is viewed as a representation of the primary reality, which is experience.”199 Perhaps 
the most notable physicist who conveyed idealistic thoughts was Heisenberg. 
Similar to Leibniz, Heisenberg argues that “the concept of smallest units of matter, the 
simple laws of which should be understood, leads at once into the well known troubles connected 
with the concept of infinity. A piece of matter can be divided; the parts can be divided again into 
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smaller parts, these smaller part can be divided again etc., but we cannot imagine that this 
divisibility goes on forever.”200 Heisenberg also offers a more modern scientific account of 
Berkeley’s argument about properties not belonging to matter. He explains that “[t]he great 
variety of different phenomena, the many observed properties of matter, can be reduced to the 
position and the motion of the atoms. Properties like smell or color or taste or temperature do not 
apply to the atoms; but the position or motion of the atoms can indirectly produce these 
properties of matter.”201 On the topic of the big accelerators attempting to split the elementary 
particles even further, Heisenberg notes, “When two particles collide with extremely high energy, 
they actually go into pieces, sometimes quite a number of pieces, but the pieces are not smaller 
than the particles that has been split…. Even in cosmic radiation where the available energy can 
occasionally be a thousand times larger than in the biggest accelerator, no different or smaller 
particles have been found.”202 Therefore, Heisenberg argues that an accurate explanation of these 
collisional phenomena “is not to say that particles have been split, but to speak about the creation 
of particles out of energy, according to the laws of relativity. We can say that all particles are 
made of the same fundamental substance, which may be called energy or matter; and to 
formulate: the fundamental substance ‘energy’ becomes ‘matter’ by assuming the form of an 
elementary particle.”203 It appears, then, that the best way to understand these elementary 
particles is in an idealistic sense. At the fundamental level these particles are immaterial waves 
of potential. They are not actually material and do not have size in the material sense, but they 
manifest as the appearance of matter. Heisenberg says, “In the experiments about atomic events 
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we have to do with things and facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in 
daily life. But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world 
of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts.”204 This idea could be viewed 
as similar to Berkeley’s idea that the common sense notion that most people have (realism) does 
not actually make sense when one investigates the very nature of matter. Roger G. Newton, 
author of The Truth of Science, explains, “The essential point to be stressed, and to that extent I 
agree with both Bohr and Heisenberg, is that realism is a matter of scale. It is one thing to be a 
realist at the scale of everyday life and experience, but quite another to try to carry that realism to 
the micro world, where neither our experience nor our language is adequate.”205   
Bohr also describes certain aspects of quantum physics that are in line with the theme of 
unity in idealism. For instance, he explains that “the discovery of the universal quantum of action 
to which Planck was led in the first year of our century by his penetrating analysis of the laws of 
thermal radiation…. revealed in atomic processes a feature of wholeness quite foreign to the 
mechanical conception of nature.”206 He states that this elementary quantum of action “revealed 
a feature of wholeness inherent in atomic processes, going far beyond the ancient idea of the 
limited divisibility of matter.”207 These ideas are similar to Leibniz’s about the divisibility of 
matter and the idea of wholeness is essential to idealism. Further similarities between quantum 
physics and idealism will be seen even more in the idea of nonlocality. 
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Nonlocality 
 
Stapp explains that the “idea of locality is fairly simple and straightforward in classical 
physics, because in that setting everything has a material basis and all causal effect [sic] are 
associated with transfers of momentum or energy, which moves about in a continuous no-faster-
than-light way.”208 However, “[i]n quantum theory the fundamental substrate of causation is 
more ephemeral: causation is carried by potentialities for observational events to occur. These 
potentialities usually change in a localized continuous way, but, in conventional quantum 
mechanics, they change abruptly in association with the occurrence of an actual observation or 
observer-controlled input.”209 Stapp explains that a “‘cause,’ such as the performance of a freely 
chosen measurement procedure in one region, can have a certain kind of instantaneous faraway 
effect without any energy or momentum traveling from the region of the cause to the region of 
the effect.”210 Thus, Stapp argues that “nonlocality” contrasts the locality assumption of relativity 
theory which says “that no information about which experiment is freely chosen and performed 
in one spacetime region can be present in a second spacetime region unless a point traveling at 
the speed of light (or less) can reach some point in the second region from some point in the 
first.”211 He further explains, “This assumption is valid in relativistic classical physics. Yet 
quantum theory permits the existence of certain experimental situations in which this 
information-based locality assumption fails.”212 In order to understand these experimental 
situations one must first understand the Pauli exclusion principle and Bell’s theorem.  
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Michela Massimi, author of Pauli’s Exclusion Principle: The Origin and Validation of a 
Scientific Principle, explains that in 1925 Pauli introduced what he called an “‘extremely natural’ 
prescriptive rule.”213 The rule claimed, “In an atom there cannot be two or more equivalent 
electrons for which the values of all four quantum numbers [principal, angular momentum, 
magnetic, and spin] coincide. If an electron exists in an atom for which all of these numbers have 
definite values, then this state is occupied.”214 Massimi explains, “It is thanks to Pauli’s principle 
that one obtains the electronic configurations underlying the classification of chemical elements 
in Mendeleev’s periodic table as well as atomic spectra. To this same principle we credit the 
statistical behaviour of any half-integral spin particles (protons, neutrons, among many others) 
and the stability of matter.”215 Furthermore, “it is the exclusion principle that fixes the crucial 
constraint for binding quarks in hadrons, which together with leptons compose our physical 
world.”216 This principle provides incredible explanatory power for many aspects of nature, but 
is it justified?  
Massimi, among others, argues that it is. She explains how one year after Pauli 
introduced it, Enrico Fermi and Paul Dirac 
independently of each other… gave a more precise mathematical formulation to the rule 
by noticing that restriction to antisymmetric state functions implied it. The rule was 
accordingly reformulated as prescribing the mathematical nature of quantum states 
allowed for electrons: it excluded all classes of mathematically possible solutions of the 
wave equation for any two electrons different from the antisymmetric one. The resultant 
Fermi-Dirac statistics allowed a system of indistinguishable particles obeying Pauli’s 
principle (‘fermions’) to be only in antisymmetric states.217  
                                                
213 Michela Massimi, Pauli's Exclusion Principle: The Origin and Validation of a Scientific Principle 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1. 
214 Ibid., 8. 
215 Ibid., 1. 
216 Ibid., 1-2. 
217 Ibid., 8. 
	 63 
	
Massimi explains, “When in 1940 Pauli proved the spin-statistics theorem, it became clear that 
not only electrons, but in fact any half-integral spin particle obeyed the Fermi-Dirac statistics, 
and hence the exclusion principle.”218 Furthermore, “when quarks were introduced in the 1960s, 
they were taken as particles obeying the exclusion principle, given their half-integral spin and the 
spin-statistics connection established by Pauli’s theorem.”219 However, the discovery of “some 
prima facie negative evidence against quarks obeying Pauli’s principle gave rise to two rival 
research programmes: the parastatistics programme that revoked the strict validity of the 
exclusion principle for quarks; and quantum chromodynamics that on the contrary reconciled the 
negative evidence by introducing a further degree of freedom (‘colour’) for quarks.”220 Massimi 
argues that it “was precisely the development of these two rival research programmes that, in 
different ways, strengthened the nomological validity of Pauli’s principle.”221 Thus, Pauli’s rule 
is considered “a building-block of physics, whose validity sweeps across nuclear and atomic 
physics, from condensed matter physics to quantum chromodynamics.”222 Some might dispute 
the validity of this principle, but this dispute and possible limitations of the rule are a topic for 
another discussion. For the purposes of this paper, Pauli’s rule will be considered valid based on 
its explanatory power and success in quantum experiments. Pauli’s exclusion principle will be 
seen at work in the idea of nonlocality where two paired electrons must have opposite spin 
because if the principal, angular momentum, and magnetic quantum numbers are all the same, 
then the spin must be opposite. This supports the idea of nonlocality because it was theorized 
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that the measurement of the spin of one of the paired particles would have an instant affect on the 
other even if they were far away from each other. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) disputed 
this theory in a 1935 paper. In their thought experiment the particles were “allowed to move far 
apart before any measurement is made, so that (according to the authors) any measurement made 
on one could not affect the other.”223 The nature of this experiment is explained well by Robert 
Nadeau and Minas C. Kafatos (who studied physics at Cornell University and received his Ph.D. 
in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).  
Nadeau and Kafatos explain that if one assumes that “paired electrons originate in a 
single quantum state, like that featured in the EPR experiment, they must have equal and 
opposite spin as they move in opposite directions from this source.”224 They clarify that “since 
the spin of each paired electron is quantized and obeys the uncertainty principle, all components 
of the spin of a single electron cannot be measured simultaneously any more than position and 
momentum can be measured simultaneously.”225 Thus, a “measurement of the spin of an electron 
on one or the other of the two paths will, therefore, yield the result ‘up’ 50 percent of the time or 
‘down’ 50 percent of the time, and we cannot predict with any certainty what the result will be in 
any given measurement.”226 Nadeau and Kafatos further explain: 
When viewed in isolation, the spin of each of the paired electrons will show a random 
fluctuation pattern that would confuse attempts to know in advance the spin of the other. 
But since we also know that each of the two paired electrons has equal and opposite spin, 
the random spins in one particle should match precisely, or correlate with, those of the 
other particle when we conduct the experiment many times and view both particles 
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together rather than in isolation.227  
 
The debate from this EPR paper went on for several years until the thought experiments could be 
performed. John Bell was a key figure in theorizing a way to actually perform these experiments 
with definite results. In 1964 he deduced through a mathematical theorem “the most general 
relationships between two particles, like those in the EPR experiment, and showed that certain 
kinds of measurement could distinguish between the positions of Einstein and Bohr. One set of 
experimental results would prove quantum theory complete and Bohr correct, and another set 
would prove quantum theory incomplete and Einstein correct.”228 Nadeau and Kafatos explain 
how this was tested: 
[T]he relationship between spin states in paired electrons also applies to polarization 
states of paired photons. Polarization defines a direction in space associated with the 
wave aspect of the massless photon. The polarization of a photon, like the spin of an 
electron, also has a “yes” or “no” property that obeys the indeterminacy principle, and the 
relationship between these properties in paired photons is the same as that between paired 
electrons. Polarization of paired photons, like those in experiments testing Bell’s theory, 
is equal and opposite, and the random polarization of one paired photon should precisely 
match or correlate with the other if the experiment is run a sufficient number of times.229  
 
Nadeau and Kafatos declare that the “results of experiments testing Bell’s theory clearly reveal 
that Einstein’s assumption in the EPR thought experiment—that correlations between paired 
photons over space-like separated regions could not possibly occur—was wrong. The 
experiments show that the correlations do, in fact, hold over any distance instantly, or in ‘no 
time.’”230 They conclude, “Since this violates assumptions in local realistic theories, physical 
reality is not, as Einstein felt it should and must be, local. The experiments clearly indicate that 
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physical reality is non-local.”231 Stapp also argues that “what they [EPR] actually thereby proved 
was that Copenhagen precepts entailed the existence of faster-than-light transfers of information, 
though not the possibility of (relativity-theory-violating) faster-than-light signaling.”232 Hodgson 
explains, “[I]n a series of experiments culminating in those by Aspect in 1982, the predictions of 
quantum mechanics, along the lines considered by Bell, were confirmed, and correlations were 
observed exceeding those which could be explained in terms of pre-existing properties of the 
systems. In effect, non-locality was demonstrated and the EPR argument indeed undermined.”233  
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox seems to support the idea that consciousness, not 
matter, is the fabric of the universe. Goswami explains that “if we look at the structure of 
quantum mechanics, we find in it examples of correlated pairs for which the observation of one 
object of the pair not only collapses the wave function of that object but must also collapse the 
wave function of the other object of the pair, even though the other object is spacelike separated 
from its partner.”234 This phenomenon, often called ‘quantum entanglement,’ works like this: 
“[I]f we make a measurement of one electron of the above pair and find it to be spin-up along a 
certain direction, its partner must take on spin-down along the same direction even if spacelike 
separated.” 235 Goswami argues, “Since it is our measurement that collapses the spin of the two 
electrons in a particular state, we, our observation, must have the ability for nonlocal collapse, 
and this is a paradox for EPR.”236 Quantum entanglement is best explained through a monistic 
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idealism system, since otherwise it violates Einstein’s idea that information cannot travel faster 
than the speed of light. Aspect was able to demonstrate that the communication between two 
entangled particles is instantaneous, “occurring without the intermediary of a local signal.”237 
EPR is a paradox because it does not make sense in a materialistic universe. Einstein and his 
collaborators argued that there must be hidden variables involved. However, even if there are 
hidden variables, it has been shown that even these variables must also be nonlocal. Goswami 
explains that “the paradox is easily resolved if the locality assumption is given up. Thus one way 
out is to theorize that there is an ‘ether’ behind the space-time scene where faster-than-light 
signals are allowed, and the two electrons are correlated by this superluminal connection.”238 
This “ether” can best be explained by a reality of consciousness. Goswami summarizes by saying, 
“Thus the lesson of EPR may well be that a correlated quantum system has the attribute of a 
certain unbroken wholeness not only among its parts but also with consciousness, an innate 
connection that transcends space – a nonlocal relationship. … [U]ltimately, the lesson of EPR for 
quantum mechanics may be to embrace idealism.”239 Quantum physics appears to support the 
monistic idealism idea that reality is made up of consciousness rather than matter. Stapp 
summarizes these ideas in the following: 
The failure of this locality condition absolutely precludes the possibility that the real 
world actually conforms to the precepts of classical physics. We do live in a quantum 
world in which far-apart aspects are linked in ways quite contrary to the mechanistic 
conception of nature postulated by classical mechanics. A beautiful, intricate, and 
rationally coherent mathematical machinery has been discovered that transforms the 
mechanistic mindless concepts of classical physics over to a highly tested, useful, and 
accurate mathematical picture of a nonlocal reality in which our streams of consciousness 
are naturally and efficaciously imbedded. It would seem that the quantum conception of 
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nature is, from the perspective of science, the appropriate physics foundation of any 
ostensibly deep inquiry into the details of the mind-matter connection, and hence into the 
nature of our own being.240  
 
Quantum physics appears to be a natural building block for a metaphysical foundation imbedded 
in monistic idealism. The two systems seem to support one another. Further support for monistic 
idealism can be seen in experiments done in psychology.  
 
Psychology 
 
Countless experiments and studies have been done in neuropsychology and with the 
placebo effect that justify the idea of consciousness having influence over matter (primarily the 
brain). Perhaps it is worth mentioning in passing that the eminent psychologist Carl Jung’s 
theory of the collective unconscious might support monistic idealism; however, that is a 
discussion for another work. In this section three specific topics in psychology will be discussed 
to provide further evidence for monistic idealism. The first topic will be nonlocal brain 
communication, next will be mental focus, and the final subject will be the placebo effect.  
 
Nonlocal Communication 
 
 Nonlocality is not only seen in quantum entanglement. Goswami outlines a series of 
experiments done that show nonlocal communication between two people without the 
exchanging of signals. The neurophysiologist Jacobo Grinberg-Zylberbaum at the University of 
Mexico performed the first of these experiments.241 Goswami summarizes this experiment in the 
following:  
Two people meditate together for twenty minutes with the intention that they 
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communicate non-locally, directly, without exchange of any signals. After the twenty 
minutes they are separated, and put into individual faraday chambers. These are 
electromagnetically impervious chambers. They still maintain that meditative state of 
intention. Now their brains are connected to individual EEG machines 
(Electroencephalogram). One subject, and only one subject, is shown a series of light 
flashes. This obviously produces electro magnetic activity in the brain and this electrical 
activity is recorded in the brainwaves in the EEG connected to the brain. From that, a 
potential can be extracted which is called Evoked Potential, potential evoked by the light 
flashes. The other subject in the meantime is just meditating. There is no light flash for 
him or her but the EEG machine connected to the brain of the second observer who 
doesn't see any light flashes nevertheless depicts a transferred potential very similar in 
both phase and strength to the evoked potential that the first observer’s EEG gives us. 
How does electrical activity transfer from one brain to another without any 
electromagnetic connection? Without any signal? The answer is quantum non-locality. 
The answer is nonlocal consciousness collapses similar events in both brains because 
through their intention they have become correlated, non-locally. There is no other way 
of understanding this result.242 
 
Furthermore, “[c]ontrol subjects (who do not meditate together or are unable meditatively to hold 
the intention for signal-less communication during the experiment) do not show any transferred 
potential.”243 These results are astonishing and certainly provide further evidence for nonlocality. 
As Goswami explains, “The experiment demonstrates the nonlocality of brain responses to be 
sure, but also something even more important—nonlocality of quantum consciousness.”244 
Conversely, Goswami acknowledges that “for a while scientists objected. 'Ok maybe Jacobo's 
methodology was not quite right. Maybe there was something wrong with the statistics.'”245 
However, the experiment has been reproduced a number of times— “first, by the 
neuropsychiatrist Peter Fenwick and collaborators (Sabell et al., 2001) in London; second by Jiri 
Wackermann et al. (2003); and third, by the Bastyr University researcher Leanna Standish and 
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her collaborators (Standish et al., 2004).”246 Thus, since these experiments can be reproduced, 
there is good evidence that brains can communicate nonlocally.247 Goswami explains that this 
proves “that consciousness is indeed nonlocal. It's cosmic. Consciousness that chooses from 
quantum possibilities making an actual event. Consciousness that creates this universe of 
manifestation is indeed nonlocal consciousness. Now you can call it God if you'd like. You don't 
have to. It's objective and it's scientific.”248 Goswami believes that quantum physics points to an 
impersonal god, which may partly be because in his physics classes it was unacceptable to have 
any direct reference to God.249 However, in his book God is Not Dead, he states, “These 
experiments usher a new paradigm of science based not on the primacy of matter, like the old 
science, but on the primacy of consciousness. Consciousness is the ground of all being, which we 
now can recognize as what the spiritual traditions call Godhead (Christianity), Brahman 
(Hinduism), Ain Sof (Judaism), Shunyata (Buddhism), and so on.”250 Goswami believes that in 
order for people’s conscious choices to manifest they have to align with the “ground of all 
being.”251 He further believes that one of the best qualities a person can manifest is the circuit of 
love.252 How can love be a desirable quality if the ground of all being is an impersonal god? An 
impersonal god that people have to align with seems more deterministic. In order for a person’s 
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conscious choice to manifest, it would make more sense that their will has to align with the will 
of a personal loving God that is the creator and sustainer of reality as described by the 
philosophers in the first two chapters of this project. Nonetheless, Goswami’s connection of 
quantum physics to spirituality is revolutionary.  
 
Mental Force 
 
 Additional support that it is the act of a conscious observer that collapses the wave 
function can be found in a test done with the double-slit experiment. This test done by Dean 
Radin, Leena Michel, Karla Galdamez, Paul Wendland, Robert Rickenbach, and Arnaud 
Delorme had the following results: 
A double-slit optical system was used to test the possible role of consciousness in the 
collapse of the quantum wave function. The ratio of the interference pattern’s double-slit 
spectral power to its single-slit spectral power was predicted to decrease when attention 
was focused toward the double slit as compared to away from it. Each test session 
consisted of 40 counterbalanced attention-toward and attention-away epochs, where each 
epoch lasted between 15 and 30 s. Data contributed by 137 people in six experiments, 
involving a total of 250 test sessions, indicate that on average the spectral ratio decreased 
as predicted (z=-4.6, p=6×10-6). Another 250 control sessions conducted without 
observers present tested hardware, software, and analytical procedures for potential 
artifacts; none were identified (z=0.43, p=0.67). Variables including temperature, 
vibration, and signal drift were also tested, and no spurious influences were identified. By 
contrast, factors associated with consciousness, such as meditation experience, electro 
cortical markers of focused attention, and psychological factors including openness and 
absorption, significantly correlated in predicted ways with perturbations in the double-slit 
interference pattern. The results appear to be consistent with a consciousness-related 
interpretation of the quantum measurement problem.253  
 
This test not only provides evidence that it is the conscious observer that collapses the wave 
function, but also that when a conscious observer focuses on one result rather than another, the 
result that was focused on becomes more likely to actualize. The result is even more likely to be 
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actualized if the observer has experience in meditation. There have been many experiments in 
psychology demonstrating the power of mental force; however, this particular one ties the mental 
force aspect directly to a quantum physics experiment and has profound results.  
Regarding the view that consciousness is involved in the quantum measurement problem 
(QMP), the authors of this article explain that this theory has been recognized by physicists 
“ranging from d’Espagnat to von Neumann, from Stapp to Squires. The significance of the 
proposition and the prominence of those who have proposed it have made the idea difficult to 
blithely ignore, but to many it challenges a deeply held intuition that the physical world was here, 
more or less in its present form, long before human consciousness evolved to observe it.”254 
Quantum physics may be able to provide evidence to counter this materialistic view. Specifically, 
the double-slit experiment provides a method of putting these two theories to test in hopes of 
determining the role of observation in the QMP. The authors explain that the experiment is based 
on two assumptions. The first one is “(a) [i]f information is gained—by any means—about a 
photon’s path as it travels through two slits, then the interference pattern will collapse in 
proportion to the certainty of the knowledge gained.” 255 The second one is “(b) if some aspect of 
consciousness is a primordial, self-aware feature of the fabric of reality, and that property is 
modulated by us through capacities we know as attention and intention, then focusing attention 
on a double-slit system may in turn affect the interference pattern.”256 The authors summarize 
three prior experiments that were similar to their own. The first experiment was done by a team 
at York University and was followed up by a second experiment at Princeton University.257 
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Radin et al. explain that: 
The goal in both experiments was to shift the mean of a variable that measured the 
wavelike versus particlelike nature of the interference pattern. The York team reported a 
nonsignificant mean shift opposite to the predicted direction (although curiously, the data 
showed a significantly larger variance than would be expected by chance); the Princeton 
team reported a modestly significant mean shift in the predicted direction (p=0.05).258 
 
Perhaps the most notable of the three prior experiments was the third one. Radin et al. summarize 
this experiment in the following: 
The third experiment involved a Michelson interferometer located inside a light-tight, 
double-steel-walled, electromagnetically shielded chamber. Participants one at a time sat 
quietly outside the chamber and were instructed to direct their attention toward or away 
from one arm of the interferometer. Interference patterns were recorded once per second 
and the average intensity levels of those patterns were compared in 30 s counterbalanced 
attention-toward and attention-away epochs. At the completion of the experiment, the 
results were in accordance with the prediction (p=0.002), i.e., interference was reduced 
during the observation periods. This outcome was primarily due to nine sessions 
involving experienced meditators (p=9.4×10-6). The remaining nine sessions with 
nonmeditators did not produce effects differing from those of chance (p=0.61). Control 
runs using the same setup but with no observers present also produced chance results.259  
 
Since the experiment by Radin et al. is not the only experiment with the same results, the 
probability that their results are accurate rises, much like the series of experiments from the last 
section on nonlocal communication.  
 The methodology and precautions of the Radin et al. test were very well thought out. The 
experiments considered and put to test a number of possible interferences and conditions to 
safeguard the results. For example, “To avoid potential biases associated with selective data 
reporting, all completed test sessions in the experiments described here, both preplanned and 
exploratory, were considered part of the formal experimental database and are reported.”260 The 
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experimenters also factored in conditions such as the participant’s distance from the optical 
system and they even considered the influence of temperature variances from a person leaning 
toward the device when they were focusing on it and leaning back when they were relaxed. They 
explain that such behavior “might have introduced changes in radiant heat impinging on the 
optical system, and that in turn might have influenced the interference pattern.” 261 For instance, 
“[T]he distance between the slits or the length of the HeNe laser tube might have expanded or 
contracted slightly due to temperature fluctuations. To test this possibility, a third experiment 
was designed to explore the effects of human body heat in proximity to the double-slit 
apparatus.”262 A further consideration that these experimenters made dealt with the hypothesis 
that “[i]f the consciousness collapse interpretation of the QMP is valid, then this implies that the 
collapse occurs when observation takes place, and not when the event is generated.”263 To test 
this theory, “[A] retrocausal version of the experiment was designed. This test also provided a 
more rigorous way to test the effect of participants’ proximity to the optical system, because the 
data in this study were generated and recorded with the apparatus located by itself inside the 
electromagnetically shielded chamber, and with no one else in the laboratory.”264 For this 
experiment, “Fifty sessions with 30 s counterbalanced epochs were recorded in the IONS 
laboratory in April 2009. No one was present during the process of data generation and recording, 
and the data remained unobserved. In June 2009, participants were asked to view a strip-chart 
display, which unbeknownst to them played back prerecorded but previously unobserved 
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data.”265 The results of this experiment supported their hypothesis, specifically in the test 
subjects who had experience in meditation.266 Another precaution that the experimenters made 
was to “eliminate the possibility that results observed in the initial experiments might have been 
due to differential vibrations associated with the computer’s spoken instructions, [so] the 
computer’s automated condition assignments were presented over headphones.”267 With all of 
the considerations and preventative measures this study includes, it seems as though it was as 
exhaustive and impartial as it could be.  
However, the results of the overall test were not particularly high. It is certainly not as if 
every time a subject was focusing their attention toward the double-slit optical the photons would 
only go through one of the slits instead of create an interference pattern (far from it). The 
statistics only support their hypothesis moderately. Nevertheless, the results departed from 
normal chance probability as well as from control runs in which an observer was present and 
focusing attention toward the double slit optical as opposed to away from it. Furthermore, 
experienced meditators had a significantly higher degree of success rate than nonmeditators. For 
example, the second experiment “provided modest evidence in favor of the hypothesis (z=-1.39), 
and in the IONS lab meditators again showed superior performance (z=-2.04) as compared to 
nonmeditators (z=-0.49).”268 These results show that conscious efforts impact the results and 
specifically that people with experience in meditation (conscious effort) have a higher success 
rate. 
If one assumes, as monistic idealism claims, that the very foundation of reality is 
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ultimately in God’s consciousness, then it makes sense that conscious efforts may play a part in 
the manifestation of reality, if God allows for it. Since it is ultimately God who creates and 
sustains the world, it is ultimately up to Him to choose which of the many possibilities will be 
actualized. However, it becomes a matter of free will whether God allows people to have any 
weight (and how much weight) in determining these actualities. From these psychological 
studies, it seems as though God does grant at least some degree of freedom in His creation’s 
choices. More specifically, it would appear as though those individuals who are more in tune 
with their conscious efforts are accorded a greater degree of weight in this manifestation. This is 
consistent with the Christian idea of faith and its differing degrees, ranging all the way to 
walking on water (Peter) and Jesus' teaching that faith can move mountains. These are, of course, 
examples of tremendous faith, and the subject of miracles would need to be discussed if this 
topic were to be further pursued. It makes sense, along the lines of both quantum physics and 
monistic idealism, that such miracles would be rare and that the natural world would follow the 
laws that it does (e.g., gravity), because these laws stem from the very logical nature of God and 
how He thinks. Anything deviating from these laws would require the allowance of God and 
deviation from His natural laws. Thus, it would have to be an event that is in line with the will of 
God and based on the faith of an agent that He has granted free will. The fact that the results in 
this test only modestly supported the authors’ hypothesis could actually be supportive of 
monistic idealism in this sense. 
The article concludes by discussing why, given that it is so central to the interpretation of 
quantum physics, there is not more experimental literature testing these ideas. They suggest that 
it is because the “notion that consciousness may be related to the formation of physical reality 
has come to be associated more with medieval magic and so-called New Age ideas than it is with 
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sober science. As a result, it is safer for one’s scientific career to avoid associating with such 
dubious topics and subsequently rare to find experiments examining these ideas in the physics 
literature.”269 However, they were able to find 
over a thousand peer-reviewed studies reporting (a) experiments testing the effects of 
intention on the statistical behavior of random events derived from quantum fluctuations, 
(b) studies involving macroscopic random systems such as tossed dice and human 
physiology as the targets of intentional influence, (c) experiments involving sequential 
observations to see whether a second observer could detect if a quantum event had been 
observed by a first observer, or if time-delayed observations would result in similar 
effects, and (d) experiments investigating conscious influence on nonliving systems 
ranging from molecular bonds in water to the behavior of photons in interferometers.270 
 
There definitely seems to be a movement, despite how small of a movement it may be, in the 
direction of recognizing consciousness and mental force as real phenomena.  
Schwartz’s work with OCD patients is also a powerful discovery that shows how through 
mental force and intentions people can essentially rewire their brain. Schwartz developed an 
excellent Four Steps program that assists OCD patients in reshaping their brain. He explains that 
“[m]indfulness, as applied in the Four Steps, alters how the connections between the orbital 
frontal cortex and the caudate nucleus function. The power of attention, and thus the power of 
mind, reshapes neural circuitry and cortical maps—and does so by means of what I call Directed 
Mental Force.”271 He provides an insightful analysis of similar work and explains, “[O]ther 
scientists began collecting data showing that, as in my own studies of OCD patients, brain 
changes do not require changes in either the quantity or the quality of sensory input. To the 
contrary: the brain could change even if all patients did was use mindfulness to respond to their 
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thoughts differently. Applied mindfulness could change neuronal circuitry.”272 He describes how 
neuronal circuits change when “something as gossamer as our thoughts changes, when 
something as inchoate as mental effort becomes engaged—when, in short, we choose to attend 
with mindfulness.” 273 Schwartz argues, “The power of attention not only allows us to choose 
what mental direction we will take. It also allows us, by actively focusing attention on one rivulet 
in the stream of consciousness, to change—in scientifically demonstrable ways—the systematic 
functioning of our own neural circuitry.”274  
Schwartz clarifies that the brain does usually behave as a machine, as it “registers sensory 
information, processes it, connects it with previously stored sensory experience, and generates an 
output.”275 His work with OCD patients demonstrates that “[w]hen an obsessive thought or 
compulsive urge enters a patient’s mind, the feelings of fear and anxiety it generates are 
biologically determined. But, as clinical data and PET scans show, patients can willfully change 
the amount and quality of attention that they focus on those cerebrally generated feelings of 
anxiety and stress, changing in turn the way the brain works.”276 He elucidates this by saying, 
“Through changes in the way we focus attention, we have the capacity to make choices about 
what mental direction we will take; more than that, we also change, in scientifically 
demonstrable ways, the systematic functioning of neural circuitry. … By Refocusing attention in 
a mindful fashion, patients change their neurochemistry.”277 Thus, Schwartz proclaims that there 
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is now a “scientific basis for asserting that the exercise of the will, the effort of attention, can 
systematically change the way the brain works. The act of focusing attention has both clinical 
efficacy… and biological efficacy. Mind, we now see, has the power to alter biological matter 
significantly; that three-pound lump of gelatinous ooze within our skulls is truly the mind’s 
brain.”278 This work of Schwartz’s is incredible and provides further evidence of mental force. 
Even more grounds for accepting mental force will be seen in the placebo effect. 
 
Placebo Effect 
 
 Mario Beauregard, author of the journal article “Effect of mind and brain activity: 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies of psychotherapy and placebo effect,” reviews 
“neuroimaging studies of the effect of psychotherapy in patients suffering from diverse forms of 
psychopathology (obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, unipolar major depressive 
disorder, spider phobia)” 279 as well as “neuroimaging studies of the placebo effect in healthy 
individuals (placebo analgesia, psychostimulant expectation) and patients with Parkinson’s 
disease or unipolar major depressive disorder.”280 His review of recent neuroimaging studies on 
such patients “strongly support the view that the subjective nature and the intentional content of 
mental processes significantly influence the various levels of brain functioning (e.g. molecular, 
cellular, neural circuit) and brain plasticity.”281 These results are in line with expectations of 
monistic idealism. 
 Beauregard explains that placebo “refers to ‘any treatment —e.g. psychotherapy, drugs, 
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surgery, and quack therapy— used for its ameliorative effect on a symptom or disease but that is 
actually ineffective or not specifically effective for the condition being treated.’ The study of the 
placebo effect is the study of the psychosocial context (in particular, the therapist’s words) that 
affects the therapeutic outcome.”282 He argues, “The psychophysiological responses induced by 
placebos appear to reflect a mind/body interaction that is guided by subjective factors such as 
beliefs, expectations, meaning, hope for improvement and relational parameters.”283 The 
complete results that Beauregard arrived at are the following: 
[T]he neuroimaging studies of placebo corroborate that the patient’s beliefs and 
expectations play a crucial role in this effect. These results also confirm the notion that 
the placebo effect can be extremely specific. Thus, in PD [Parkinson’s disease] patients a 
clinical placebo response can be associated with release of endogenous dopamine in the 
striatum or decreased activity in single neurons of the STN [sub-thalamic nucleus]. As for 
MDD [major depressive disorder], placebo can induce metabolic changes in cortical and 
paralimbic brain regions that are relatively comparable with those of fluoxetine. 
Moreover, placebo manipulations can diminish neural activity in pain-responsive regions 
such as the rACC [anterior cingulate cortex], anterior insula and thalamus, and activate 
the endogenous opioid system in the DLPFC [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex], pregenual 
rostral ACC, anterior insular cortex and nucleus accumbens. Importantly, in one of the 
experiments conducted by Wager et al., placebo-induced BOLD [blood-oxygen-level-
dependent] signal increases in DLPFC were correlated with placebo-induced BOLD 
signal decreases during pain in the thalamus, insula and rACC. In addition, in the Zubieta 
et al. study, endogenous opioid activity in the DLPFC was significantly correlated with 
the magnitude of analgesia expected by the volunteers before placebo administration. 
Collectively, the results of the neuroimaging studies of placebo effect indicate that beliefs 
and expectations can markedly modulate neurophysiological and neurochemical activity 
in brain regions implicated in perception, movement, pain and various aspects of emotion 
processing.284  
 
The overall results of these neuroimaging studies align with the arguments and studies examined 
throughout this project and show with strong evidence that the mind has the ability to influence 
the brain. Beauregard analyzed several different placebo studies that each varied in what disease 
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was being treated and each one took preventive measures to assure accurate results such as 
control subjects and blind studies wherein the people administrating the experiment did not know 
if they were supplying a placebo or actual drug. By way of interpreting these results, Beauregard 
has a number of insights. 
 Beauregard argues that the results of these neuroimaging studies challenge the 
psychophysical identity theory and epiphenomenalism, “the belief that mental processes and 
subjective experience are merely epiphenomena of underlying neuronal processes.”285 He 
explains that the psychophysical identity theory holds that “mental processes (including 
intentional ones) are identical with neural processes. For epiphenomenalism, mental processes 
are causally inert epiphenomena (side-effects or by-products) of neural processes.”286 He further 
explains how “[t]hese findings also call in question eliminative materialism (or eliminativism). 
According to this philosophical position, mental processes and functions (e.g. consciousness, 
intentions, desires, beliefs, self) can be reduced entirely to brain processes.”287 Regarding these 
materialist views, Beauregard says that the “physically describable brain mechanisms represent 
the core and final explanatory vehicle for every kind of psychologically described data. These 
views are extremely counterintuitive, since our most basic experience teaches us that our choice 
of perspective about how we apprehend our mental states makes an enormous difference in how 
we respond to them.”288 He further argues, “We must keep in mind that the whole human 
person—not merely a part of her brain—thinks, feels or believes. Indeed, the human person 
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cannot be reduced to neural processes.”289 Contrary to the psychophysical identity theory and 
epiphenomenalism, Beauregard argues that the results of these studies “strongly suggest that 
mentalistic variables (e.g. consciousness, metacognition, volition, beliefs, hopes) and their 
intentional content (the first-person perspective) are neither identical with nor reducible to brain 
processes.”290 Beauregard contends that these studies “also suggest that mental processes/events 
do exert a causal influence on brain plasticity and the various levels of brain functioning (e.g. 
molecular, cellular, neural circuit). Indeed, by changing our mind we are changing our brain.”291 
This notion directly supports Schwartz’s work with OCD patients as well, providing higher 
probability of it being accurate.  
 The view that Beauregard relies on to account for the impact of the mind on the brain is 
interactionism. He says, “[T]he most commonly held objection to interactionism is that it is not 
compatible with the causal closure of the physical world. This metaphysical belief implies that 
mind cannot exert any causal influence on the physical world. Nevertheless, orthodox quantum 
theory is supportive of interactionism.”292 Thus, Beauregard also recognizes the correlation 
between quantum theory and the role of consciousness. The view of interactionism is usually 
classified as a metaphysical dualism. However, the way that he understands it actually appears to 
be more in line with monistic idealism. To illustrate this, he argues that in order to properly 
interpret the results of these neuroimaging studies, a hypothesis is needed that accounts for the 
relationship between the mental activity and brain activity.293 The hypothesis that he proposes is 
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the Psychoneural Translation Hypothesis (PTH). He explains that “[a]ccording to the PTH, the 
mind (the psychological world, the first-person perspective) and the brain (the ‘physical’ world, 
the third-person perspective) represent two epistemologically and ontologically distinct domains 
that can interact because they are complementary aspects of the same underlying reality.” 294 
Thus, Beauregard argues, “The PTH posits that mind (including consciousness) represents an 
irreducible and fundamental aspect of our world.”295 The idea of two complementary aspects of 
the same underlying reality is very similar to what Stapp and Schwartz argued and appears to be 
in agreement with monistic idealism. 
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Interpretation Objection 
One main objection from Victor Stenger, among others, is that the physicists who made 
the original quantum physics discoveries did not choose their wording carefully and it is because 
of their poor word choices that people make idealistic interpretations of quantum physics. 
Stenger states: 
Ironically, this seemingly profound association between quantum and mind is an artifact, 
the consequence of unfortunate language used by Bohr, Heisenberg, and others who 
originally formulated quantum mechanics. In describing the necessary interaction 
between the observer and what is being observed, and how the state of a system is 
determined by the act of its measurement, they inadvertently left the impression that 
human consciousness enters the picture to cause that state to come into being. This led 
many who did not understand the physics but liked the sound of the words used to 
describe it to infer a fundamental human role in what was previously a universe that 
seemed to have need for neither gods nor humanity. If Bohr and Heisenberg had spoken 
of measurements made by inanimate instruments rather than by “observers,” perhaps this 
strained relationship between quantum and mind would not have been drawn. For nothing 
in quantum mechanics requires human involvement.296  
 
However, these physicists were in fact very aware of the wording that they were using and the 
implications they held. They were scientists and philosophers who understood exactly what they 
were implying with their profound discoveries. For example, Niels Bohr poses the question, 
“What is it that we humans ultimately depend on?”297 He answers that humans depend on words 
and that it is their duty to communicate “experience and ideas to others. We must strive 
continually to extend the scope of our description, but in such a way that our messages do not 
thereby lose their objective or unambiguous character…. We are suspended in language in such a 
way that we cannot say what is up and what is down. The word ‘reality’ is also a word, a word 
which we must learn to use correctly.”298 These scientists knew that they were making 
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revolutionary discoveries in the understandings of physics that would change the world. 
Heisenberg says:  
Light and matter are both single entities, and the apparent duality arises in the limitations 
of our language. It is not surprising that our language should be incapable of describing 
the processes occurring within the atoms, for, as has been remarked, it was invented to 
describe the experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving 
exceedingly large numbers of atoms. Furthermore, it is very difficult to modify our 
language so that it will be able to describe these atomic processes, for words can only 
describe things of which we can form mental pictures, and this ability, too, is a result of 
daily experience. Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has 
been possible to invent a mathematical scheme — the quantum theory — which seems 
entirely adequate for the treatment of atomic processes; for visualization, however, we 
must content ourselves with two incomplete analogies — the wave picture and the 
corpuscular picture.299   
 
Thus, Heisenberg, too, knew full well that he was making profound discoveries and that 
language is limiting the description of this newly discovered reality. Stenger is an advocate of 
mechanism, which may be what makes him think that idealism is not a realistic interpretation of 
quantum physics.300 
C.J. List also had the same initial reaction as Stenger: “My first reaction to this was that it 
was yet another case of loose talk on the part of scientists and popularizers of science when they 
are trying to explain complicated things to nonscientists.”301 However, he later realized that the 
physicists actually meant what they were saying: 
My convenient hypothesis that this new movement toward subjective idealism was a 
result of loose talk on the part of scientists writing for popular consumption was forever 
falsified by the essay of the physicist Eugene Wigner. Wigner says for example that: 
“When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic 
phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness 
came to the fore again: It was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in 
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a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness….” At this point I simply 
had to begin to take it seriously— some physicists really do not believe the moon is there 
when nobody is looking.302  
 
List seems to have a misunderstanding of idealism. It would be helpful for him if he understood 
that the entire idealistic system is dependent on God perceiving all things (not humans). List 
believes “[t]he idealist maintains that everything depends for its existence upon the existence of a 
human mind.”303 One of the key features in Berkeley’s philosophy, as seen in chapter two, was 
that existence is ultimately dependent on God’s mind.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Through the analysis of idealistic arguments and evidence from physics, it has been 
shown that monistic idealism has a great deal of explanatory power as a metaphysical system for 
the reality that one experiences. Some of the arguments that support this claim include the 
inadequateness of Cartesian matter, the seemingly infinite divisibility of atoms, matter being 
reducible to sensations, the unnecessary aspect of matter given a creator, and simplicity. Further 
evidence was found in support from quantum physics. Such factors include the necessary role of 
an observer in the collapse of a quantum wave function and the element of nonlocality. 
Psychological experiments including nonlocal communication, the power of mental force, and 
the placebo effect also provide justification for monistic idealism.  
 The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics and its implications support an 
understanding that consciousness is the fabric of reality. The discoveries made at the quantum 
level are understood well through a monistic idealism system, especially the role of a conscious 
observer in the wave function collapse and in the nonlocality that is required by quantum physics. 
Mohanty agrees that an idealistic reading of the Copenhagen interpretation best explains the data 
and that it has support from strong philosophical arguments within idealism.304 Mohanty explains 
that quantum physics supports Kant’s idea that it is not objects that affect observers, but the 
observers that affect objects. He states that the “world (as well as things in the world) are not… 
objects (Gegenstände) for whom man is the subject. Rather, man's being-in-the world is 
characterized by a prospective caring concern, and his understanding of the world (upon which 
the sciences are founded) is inseparable from his projects and presuppose the pre-understanding 
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grounded in the temporality of his existence.”305 However, contrary to Kant, he argues that the 
observer and the object are both in one unified system.306 This is the point of monistic idealism; 
that reality takes place within a unified realm of consciousness, thus eliminating the mind-body 
problem. Goswami argues that the philosophy of dualism is not “considered tenable if we take a 
scientific, explanatory, and verifiable approach. Take the dualism of consciousness and matter, 
for example. If consciousness and matter are truly dualistic, that is, made of two entirely 
different substances, then how do they interact? Their interaction requires a mediator. The 
obvious absence of a mediator speaks in favor of monism.”307 This mind-body problem was one 
of the main reasons why this investigation of the plausibility of idealism was pursued by 
Berkeley et al. in the modern period.  
 Thus, idealism, by virtue of its simplicity, best explains the interactions between subject 
and object. However, can it account for the material appearance of the world? Yes, quantum 
physics explains how the elementary particles that make up the world are not material in nature. 
They are better explained as waves of potential that take on a physical appearance upon 
observation. Furthermore, the lack of physical matter in the world causes no problems for the 
philosophical explanation of reality. In fact, matter seems to be unnecessary and reality can be 
explained better and more directly through mere sensibility. An infinite mind is required for the 
production of such a sensible world, but this idea works well with quantum physics. There must 
be a source of the waves of possibilities that physics has discovered and God makes perfect sense 
as this source. Furthermore, the nature of how a wave function collapses requires both the source 
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and an observer. Perhaps, then, God is continually producing this world for His creation to 
observe and experience. The psychological studies suggest that this is the case and that God 
grants a degree of freedom in His subjects based on their conscious efforts. God manifests the 
proper physical environment for His observers but it is these observers who anticipate certain 
results. The physical appearance that people experience is best understood as God facilitating an 
environment that His creation can sensibly experience. An omnipotent God would not need a 
separate substance to provide this, for He can perform this directly through consciousness. This 
notion is in agreement with the orthodox interpretation of quantum physics and with orthodox 
Christianity. 
Idealism is mostly a change of perspective, but it makes a tremendous difference as a 
metaphysical foundational starting point, for upon it much can be built that cannot be founded on 
materialism. A benefit of a metaphysical reality wherein consciousness is the underlying 
foundation is that it puts one into a closer relationship with the rest of the world and with God. 
As Bernard Haisch puts it: “Our minds are filtered from the mind of God. Our thoughts are 
filtered from the thoughts of God…. Your conscious being is of the very same stuff as God’s; 
your immortal spirit is filtered from God’s immortal spirit. Each of us is like one tiny dot of 
color on a slide of brilliant complexity—and God is the white light of potential out of which we 
have emerged.”308 In idealism there is no separation between mind and matter that needs to be 
resolved. In dualism there is a separation between what is spiritual and the physical world that 
one experiences. This creates a parting from spirituality that is not necessary. For in idealism 
both aspects can be accounted for in one unified reality in which everything is spiritual. 
It is the hope of this project that philosophers will consider more seriously the scientific 
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support of idealism and that scientists will more openly consider the philosophical and 
experimental support of idealism. It is also a hope that a reader of this project will see the 
inadequacy of the materialist interpretation of reality as compared to idealism, specifically the 
materialist idea that the mind is merely an epiphenomenon of the brain and not a real substance. 
As these scientists are discovering that consciousness plays a major role in physics, they are 
trying to come up with ways to explain this phenomenon without recognizing that consciousness 
is a real substance of its own. They attempt to explain emotions such as love and hate as simply 
chemical processes in a material brain. This is a danger that will only continue to trap scientists 
in the limiting belief of materialism. Not only does consciousness need to be recognized as 
metaphysically real, it also needs to be acknowledged that consciousness is necessarily 
connected to every aspect of reality, rather than viewing it as a substance separate from matter. 
Bohr argues, “[C]onsciousness, as we know it, is inseparably connected with life.”309 This 
necessary and inseparable connectedness is what makes the best metaphysical view a monistic 
one. It can be hypothesized why one would not want to go in this direction. Perhaps the scientist 
does not want to step out of his or her field into the realm of philosophical arguments about the 
nature of reality. Also, Schwartz claims, “[T]o suggest that anything other than brain 
mechanisms in and of themselves constitute the causal dynamics of a mental phenomenon is to 
risk being dismissed out of hand.”310 He also states, “[T]o pronounce oneself a skeptic on the 
subject of biological determinism is to court ridicule, to risk being tarred with the brush of ‘non-
scientific thinking.’”311 Furthermore, Radin et al. mention that it is safer for one’s scientific 
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career to avoid the idea that “consciousness may be related to the formation of physical 
reality.”312 Thus, if it is a risk even to recognize that consciousness is real and not reducible to 
matter, then how much more of a risk is it to declare that consciousness is all that there is and 
matter is an epiphenomenon of mind? However, these fears should be cast aside in the pursuit of 
discovering truth, wherever it may lead, for that is the very purpose of both philosophy and 
science.  
Hopefully this project has demonstrated that idealism can be taken as a probable 
explanation of reality. Further studies could take this notion from a likely possibility to a more 
inductively strong argument in favor of idealism. An argument for the existence of God could be 
given based on quantum physics and Berkeley’s arguments for God. Consideration could be 
given to what form of idealism works best, as well as to specific objections to idealism, 
addressing why idealism should be favored over dualism. This project was so broad an argument 
in favor of monistic idealism that it did not leave room to deal with such specific arguments 
against idealism. There is also much that could be considered as regards what might be derived 
from the metaphysics of idealism, such as an ethical system. Lastly, someone with expertise in 
physics that I do not possess could give a deeper analysis and interpretation of the original works 
of the founders of quantum physics and address the philosophical implications of more recent 
developments such as the unified field theory, Higgs field, string theory, quantum teleportation 
and the Higgs boson. A final suggested study would explore the concept of paradox in quantum 
physics as it relates to that in theology, in particular, Christ’s two natures and God’s three-in-
oneness.  
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